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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY

Land-based investments can create significant grievances for local individuals or
communities, and host governments seeking to address those grievances must navigate
a complicated landscape of legal obligations and pragmatic considerations. This report
focuses on practical solutions for governments confronting grievances that arise from
large-scale investments in agricultural or forestry projects.

These solutions are considered in the context of governments’ legal
obligations, particularly those imposed by international investment law,
international human rights law, and investor-state contracts. Understanding the implications of legal obligations is particularly important
in light of investors’ growing recourse to international investment
arbitration, which can expose a government to liability under an
international investment treaty for actions that may be in the best
interest of a country and its citizens. Indeed, governments have been
sued under investment treaties for policy measures taken in response
to public protests and petitions tied to investment projects. As a further
complication, governments may be in breach of international human
rights law when they permit, facilitate, or participate in investments
that do not comply with legally protected human rights norms.
Apart from compliance with legal obligations, host governments and
investors alike have good reasons to address “land grievances,” which
this report defines as concerns raised by local individuals or communities in response to the actual, perceived, or potential negative impacts
of land-based investments. Land grievances often stem from serious
impacts on lives and livelihoods. Given their severity, such grievances
may trigger protests, legal cases, international advocacy campaigns, or
violent conflict. Land grievances thus can increase operational costs
and create reputational or legal risks for both the investor and the
government. Addressing grievances as they arise can help mitigate,
rather than exacerbate, their impacts.
This executive summary provides an overview of common land
grievances, briefly describes governments’ competing legal obligations
that may constrain their actions vis-à-vis investors and those who are
affected by investments, and summarizes various options that governments can take to address land grievances.

LAND
GRIEVANCES
Land-based investments have given rise to scores of grievances
around the world. While grievances are specific to the project and
the community, certain issues are particularly likely to cause or
exacerbate grievances in the context of such investments:
öö Displacement and related issues, such as: a lack of consultation
or free, prior, and informed consent; a failure to provide sufficient (or any) compensation; forced evictions; and correlated
negative impacts on livelihoods and wellbeing when displacement occurs;
öö Negative effects of projects on the environment or cultural sites;
öö Failure to realize expected or promised benefits from projects;
öö Violence, ranging from physical assaults to killings, as well as
repression of protests and inappropriate detention or arrests;
and
öö Corruption, non-compliance with legal requirements, or a lack
of transparency.
Despite the strong reasons to address these and other grievances,
however, government entities sometimes confront substantial
obstacles in their pursuit of remedies. These include the frequent
lack of clarity over the best solution; disagreements among government entities or opposition from an investor; and a complex
web of legal obligations.
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LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
AND OBLIGATIONS
Legal obligations relevant to land-based investments can be found in
international law, domestic law, and, when applicable, in investor-state
contracts. With respect to international law, two bodies of law are
especially relevant: international investment law and international
human rights law.
International investment law, which arises from a network of
more than 3,000 investment treaties, is a particularly powerful force
regulating governments’ treatment of foreign investors. Most investment treaties provide foreign investors with the right to sue their
“host” governments in international investment arbitration. These
treaties may be relevant even when not anticipated by a host government, as an investor can sometimes maneuver to gain protection of
a treaty that would otherwise not apply. If an investment arbitration
tribunal finds that the government violated the investment treaty,
it typically orders the government to pay monetary damages to the
investor, which may cover both past losses and lost future profits.
Some awards have been for staggering sums. And even if a government
ultimately prevails in an arbitration, it may expend significant time and
resources in defending itself.
International investment treaties commonly impose a core set of
obligations on governments. These include the obligations:
öö To not treat foreign investors less favorably than domestic
investors (the national treatment” obligation) or less favorably
than foreign investors from another country (the “most-favored
nation” obligation);
öö To ensure any expropriation is both lawful and accompanied by
payment of just compensation;
öö To provide foreign investors “fair and equitable treatment”;
öö To provide foreign investors “full protection and security”; and
öö To adhere to any commitment entered into or owed to foreign
investors (the “umbrella clause”).
Each of these obligations has ramifications for governments’ options
for addressing land grievances. However, while understanding the
risks that arise under investment treaties can help a government better
assess its options, such risks should not dissuade a government from
taking good faith actions designed to address land grievances or comply
with its obligations under human rights law.
These human rights obligations will often create countervailing
pressures for governments in the context of land-based investments.
Like investment treaties, human rights treaties provide mechanisms for
those whose rights are violated to seek redress from governments.
Governments have three types of obligations related to human rights:
to respect human rights (by refraining from violating them), to protect
human rights (by preventing third parties from violating them), and to
fulfill human rights (by taking steps, when applicable, to progressively
realize them). The human rights most commonly affected by land-based
investments include:
öö The right to free, prior, and informed consent for
indigenous peoples;
öö The right to property;
öö The right to housing and the prohibition of forced eviction;
öö The rights to food, water, health, and a healthy environment;
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öö The rights to peaceful assembly and freedom of expression;
öö The right to liberty and security of person (including the prohibition of arbitrary arrest or detention), and the right not to be
deprived arbitrarily of one’s life; and
öö Rights related to labor and employment, such as the right to
form trade unions and the right to just and favorable conditions
of work.
In addition to international law, domestic laws and regulations are
also relevant for host governments seeking to take action on land
grievances. These domestic legal frameworks shape how land-based
investments are undertaken and regulated, providing processes
and rules to be followed. One distinction from international law is
that domestic law frequently creates legal obligations for investors,
rather than just for governments.
In countries where the government sells, leases, or otherwise
grants an investor access to land for agricultural or forestry
projects, legal obligations may also arise from the investor-state
contracts entered into between the government and the investor.
Among other obligations for both governments and investors,
these contracts occasionally include a stabilization clause limiting
the ability of the government to change laws or policies that would
negatively affect the project, or requiring compensation in such
cases. These contracts also frequently provide for arbitration
under the same or similar rules that govern arbitration arising
from investment treaties. While only an investor can bring a claim
for breach of an investment treaty obligation, either the investor
or the government can bring a claim in domestic courts or under
commercial arbitration for breach of a contractual obligation,
depending on the contract’s dispute resolution provisions.

INTERACTION BETWEEN
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
Governments’ obligations under these different legal frameworks
and agreements interact in various and complex ways. They may, at
times, also conflict.
Investor-state contracts, for example, are generally subordinate
to domestic law. However, a stabilization clause in a contract may
seek to shield the investor from having to comply with or incur the
costs of changes in the domestic law. This may be acceptable in
some jurisdictions, but may be unenforceable in others. Yet even if
a domestic court deemed a stabilization clause invalid, an investment arbitration tribunal may adopt a different view, enforcing
it under the umbrella clause and/or fair and equitable treatment
obligation. (And even in the absence of a stabilization clause, some
investment arbitration tribunals have determined that promises of
legal stability can be implied in certain circumstances.)
An investment treaty can potentially protect an entire investor-state contract (or provisions in that contract) that might
otherwise be illegal or unenforceable under domestic law—for
example, if the government entity that signed the contract did
not have the authority to do so under domestic law. Moreover,
investment treaties have been interpreted in a way that effectively

creates new property rights that might not exist under domestic law;
through the fair and equitable treatment standard, some investment
arbitration tribunals have determined that investors’ rights and mere
“legitimate expectations” are protected against subsequent government
interference, essentially turning these expectations into enforceable
property rights.
Investor-state contracts and international investment law can
also interact with international human rights law to create potentially conflicting obligations for host governments. For example, an
investor-state contract granting a concession that would displace
land users and violate their rights to food or housing would place the
government’s human rights obligations in conflict with its contractual obligations. Similarly, a broadly framed stabilization clause in an
investor-state contract may be in tension with a government’s human
rights obligations to the extent that the clause limits the applicability to
the underlying investment project of new laws or policies necessary to
respect, protect, or fulfill human rights. An applicable investment treaty
can create additional tensions between the government’s obligations
under the investment treaty and under relevant human rights treaties.
To date, international courts and tribunals have not provided much
assistance in resolving potential conflicts between treaty obligations,
tending either to avoid finding that a conflict exists or to resolve a
dispute based only on one set of legal obligations.
In some situations, a government’s legal obligations are not easy to
reconcile. Thus, governments seeking to redress land grievances should
take into account the full range of their legal obligations, and how such
obligations may reinforce or conflict with each other, as they consider
the options at their disposal.

SPECIFIC OPTIONS FOR
ADDRESSING GRIEVANCES
A government that hosts land-based investments may need to address
distinct land grievances that have been triggered by a particular
investment or investor. The following options are actions that a host
government can take to do so; each has its own set of advantages, risks,
and accompanying considerations.
REQUESTING
INVESTOR ACTION
A government can ask an investor to modify its actual or planned operations to help address related grievances. When the investor is exercising
rights given to it under a contract, license, or other authorization,
such a request would be for voluntary action, but there are pragmatic
reasons why an investor might comply. This type of request is likely
permissible under international investment law, although investment
arbitration tribunals have found governments liable for efforts to
force or pressure investors into giving up their contractual rights. This
strategy thus depends on agreement by the investor.
SHAPING OR RESHAPING
CONCESSION BOUNDARIES

the land the investor will use. This opens up the possibility that
the government can “shape” concession boundaries to minimize
negative impacts on local communities and thus reduce grievances. Additionally, even when the concession boundaries have
already been established, a government may seek to “reshape” the
boundaries to address grievances over land allocation. This may
require a full renegotiation of the investor-state contract, or could
be documented through a side letter or a simple amendment to
the contract. Efforts to shape or reshape boundaries should be
undertaken in consultation with, and with the consent of, potentially affected individuals or communities. As with the option to
request investor action, international investment law may constrain
a government’s ability to seek renegotiation, while overuse of this
strategy may also create reputational risks.
FACILITATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES FOR
AFFECTED INDIVIDUALS OR COMMUNITIES
A government can facilitate a range of efforts to resolve disputes,
including through establishing, supporting, or helping affected
individuals or communities to access dispute resolution processes.
These include local courts and tribunals, as well as “non-judicial”
mechanisms, which are not meant to replace domestic courts,
but can provide additional ways to address concerns. While such
processes come in many forms, four types are particularly relevant
for land grievances: non-judicial public institutions; government-supported mediation and facilitation between communities
and investors; project-level grievance mechanisms established
by the investor, either voluntarily or in compliance with government requirements; and external grievance mechanisms, such as
those provided by certification schemes or development finance
institutions. While dispute resolution processes can help minimize
conflict and foster solutions, they can also compound conflicts and
grievances when not designed and implemented according to best
practices.
RESTITUTING PROPERTY TO DISPLACED
INDIVIDUALS OR COMMUNITIES
Grievances flowing from land-based investments are often related
to displacement from land; in some cases, restitution of property to
those who were displaced may be the best way to address grievances
and comply with human rights obligations. However, restitution
of land already allocated to an investor may not always be possible
(for instance, if it has been irreversibly damaged), or may not be
deemed appropriate (for example, when the land was considered
to have been expropriated for a public purpose). Restitution of
land previously given to an investor may also raise risks related to
a government’s legal obligations under a contract or an applicable
investment treaty. A government seeking to take land from an
investor and return it to displaced individuals or communities
should thus first determine whether the investor has valid rights
to the land, and, if so, follow requirements set by domestic and
international law regarding expropriation of property.

In limited contexts, a government may be bound by an investor-state
contract that does not explicitly delineate the specific boundaries of
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COMPENSATING AFFECTED
INDIVIDUALS OR COMMUNITIES

REVOKING OR TERMINATING AUTHORIZATIONS
NECESSARY FOR INVESTOR OPERATIONS

Compensating individuals or communities that have been or will be
negatively affected by a land-based investment is another option for
addressing land grievances. While compensation is often an insufficient
remedy, at times it may be the most appropriate option available. When
provided, compensation—which can include the provision of land,
goods, services, and/or money—should be determined in consultation with those affected, and should seek to restore project-affected
individuals or communities to a position that is as favorable as, or more
favorable than, their position before the harm causing the grievance
occurred. Where a community remains on the land and the grievance
concerns future impacts of an investment, compensation will be less
appropriate, unless the community has provided its free, prior, and
informed consent. A government otherwise seeking to “resettle and
compensate” may violate its legal obligations under human rights law,
or risk inflaming community discontent that could lead to disruption of
the investment project or other negative outcomes.

Similarly to terminating a contract, a government may decide to
address land grievances in certain cases by revoking or terminating
existing permits or other authorizations that are necessary for
investor operations. While revoking authorizations can benefit a government and communities in some situations—for example, if the
revocation was due to harms caused by the investor—such an action
may pose legal, economic, and political challenges. At the domestic
level, it may prompt negative reactions from stakeholders affected by
the action. At the international level, a foreign investor’s home state
may use diplomatic channels to seek reversal of the decision, or the
investor may challenge it under an international investment treaty
or the investor-state contract. If government officials complied with
substantive and procedural legal requirements, revocations are more
difficult to challenge. However, neither good faith nor compliance
with domestic law will necessarily immunize permit revocations
from successful challenges under investment treaties.

RENEGOTIATING WITH
THE INVESTOR
When land grievances arise from the legal terms of the investor-state
contract or the scope of the investor’s rights and obligations under that
contract, a government might explore renegotiation of the investor-state contract. Renegotiations can be challenging, however, particularly if an investor is unwilling to give up rights previously secured or to
take on new obligations. Efforts to understand the investor’s strategy
and culture can be helpful for assessing whether it might agree to a renegotiation request. If a government tries to exercise political pressure
and takes or threatens sovereign action to force renegotiation, however,
this can raise the risk of liability under a contract or investment treaty.
Because of this risk, a government seeking to renegotiate should try to
do so using only the weight that a normal contracting party would use.
TERMINATING AN
INVESTOR-STATE CONTRACT
Another option for addressing land grievances related to an investor-state contract is to terminate the contract. Typically, the terms of
the contract and domestic law will specify the grounds on which one or
both parties may or must terminate the contract, as well as any related
remedies. Even if a government has concluded that it has valid rights to
terminate the contract, the investor may nevertheless seek to challenge
the termination through domestic courts, commercial arbitration, or
investment arbitration. In addition, a government may occasionally
decide that contract termination is in its best interests even when not
permitted; in such a case, it may simply plan to terminate and then pay
compensation and/or face legal actions.
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GENERAL OPTIONS FOR
ADDRESSING GRIEVANCES
Host governments may also seek to improve their overarching
approach to addressing land grievances by implementing more
systemic change or by minimizing their general liability under investment treaties. Taking proactive and general steps can be advantageous at times, and a host government concerned about protecting
its citizens from the negative impacts of investments may wish to
consider the below steps either before or after problems arise.
DEVELOPING A NATIONAL STRATEGY
FOR LEGAL AND POLICY REFORM
Land grievances will often center on issues that require comprehensive solutions, such as through law or policy reform. A government
may develop a national strategy for reforming laws or policies
to better protect against the negative impacts of investments or
other business operations. National Action Plans on business
and human rights (“NAPs”) are one example of a national policy
strategy that can be undertaken. NAPs do not have any legal force,
but are intended to guide legal and policy reform. They also can
improve coordination among government departments, enhancing
the government’s ability to regulate investments. In addition, the
process of developing a national policy strategy may potentially help
a government avoid or succeed in an investment dispute, by assisting
the government in establishing that its reforms were reasonable,
legitimate, and considered.

ADOPTING CHANGES
IN THE LAW
Grievances regarding land-based investments may arise because of
inadequate domestic laws that create, exacerbate, or fail to protect
against harms. If so, changes to the legal framework, including to the
constitution, to laws, or to regulations or administrative policies, may
help to holistically address concerns. However, in addition to opposition from certain stakeholders and associated political hurdles, these
changes may face legal challenges regarding their consistency with
other legal norms and obligations. Contractual stabilization clauses
and international investment treaties are two such potential sources of
conflict: an investor benefiting from a stabilization clause may either
be freed from, or be entitled to compensation for the costs of, having
to comply with changes in the law, while an investment arbitration
tribunal may find that promises of stability in the legal framework can
be inferred even in the absence of such a clause.
REQUESTING AN ADVISORY OPINION
FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL
A host government under the jurisdiction of either the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights or the African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights could seek an advisory opinion on complying with its human
rights obligations in the context of other legal obligations, such
as those contained in international investment treaties. Advisory
opinions are not binding, but their persuasive character render
them important sources for clarifying international legal rights and
corresponding government obligations. While an advisory opinion
would generally focus on overarching issues, rather than on specific
investments or grievances, and would not be binding on an investment
arbitration tribunal, the existence of one may give pause to investors
contemplating a claim.
INTERPRETING
INVESTMENT TREATIES
A host government may wish to assess how its investment treaty
obligations would be interpreted in any future disputes brought before
an investment arbitration tribunal. Although a government cannot
unilaterally change these obligations (except by pulling out of a treaty
altogether), it can take steps to assist future tribunals in interpreting
such obligations. Two mechanisms for doing so are through establishing “subsequent agreement” and “subsequent practice” on the
meaning of its treaties. This includes using inter-state agreements and
domestic practices to demonstrate its understanding of investment
treaty obligations. Although subsequent agreements and subsequent
practice do not generally bind tribunals, they provide governments
with an important opportunity to help shape the interpretations given
to a treaty. Taking such steps thus might be useful for governments
that anticipate potential problems related to land-based investments,

and are concerned that their investment treaty obligations might be
interpreted in a way that they do not intend.
DECLINING TO CONCLUDE NEW TREATIES,
AND TERMINATING OR NOT RENEWING EXISTING TREATIES
Some governments concerned about the implications of international investment treaties on their ability to address land grievances
may decide to review their treaty policies, place moratoria on
the negotiation of new investment treaties, or terminate existing
treaties. These actions can help reduce exposure to claims and liabilities for conduct that affects the rights or expectations of foreign
investors. These strategies may not necessarily eliminate the costs
of those treaties, however. For instance, even when an investment
treaty has been terminated, it may have a survival clause that keeps
it and its investment arbitration provisions in force for a set period
of time. And even if a government decides not to conclude new
treaties, it will still remain vulnerable to claims and liability under
existing ones. This may be a significant limitation, given the ability of
investors to structure their investments in order to gain protection
of other investment treaties.

MOVING
FORWARD
Dealing with grievances related to land-based investments can be
complicated for host governments. The investor and project-affected
communities will often have opposing perspectives on how to
resolve grievances. Moreover, the complex web of legal obligations
that bind a government can constrain its options, rendering it
difficult to achieve optimal solutions in all cases.
In spite of these complications, host governments have at their
disposal a range of options to address land grievances. Not all
options are suitable for every situation, and some entail risks. The
risk of doing nothing, however, will often be greater—for governments, investors, and affected individuals and communities.
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INTRODUCTION
Governments that host foreign investments in agriculture or forestry often encounter
grievances from persons adversely affected by such investments. While many
governments regard land-based investments as potential vehicles for accelerating
national development, governments are also finding it increasingly difficult to ignore the
significant concerns raised by local individuals and communities. Yet seeking to mitigate
the adverse effects of existing investments and address related grievances can place
governments in confrontation with investors that are not open to altering their operations.

Such situations can be particularly precarious for governments that
have signed international investment treaties providing investor
protections. In this context, making a decision that is in the best
interest of the country and its citizens may expose a government to
potential liability under an investment treaty, and can lead to costly
investor-state arbitration (also known as “investor-state dispute settlement” (ISDS)). Indeed, governments have been sued under investment
treaties for policy measures taken in response to public protests
and petitions tied to investment projects. As a further complication,
governments may be in breach of international human rights law when
they permit, facilitate, or participate in investments that do not comply
with legally protected human rights norms.
On a pragmatic level, host governments and investors both have
good reasons to address “land grievances,” which this report defines
as concerns raised by local individuals or communities in response
to the actual, perceived, or potential negative impacts of land-based
investments. Land grievances can lead to conflict, increased operational
costs, and reputational risks for both the investor and the
government. They can also threaten the stability of the investment
itself, leading to the risk that the expected benefits of the investment
will not materialize.
There are various steps that host governments can take to address
land grievances, but little guidance exists for doing so. Rather, more
focus has been placed on the ex ante best practices that should be
followed before investments are made. While there is no substitute for
ensuring at the outset that investments are responsible and sustainable,
the knowledge gap regarding what to do once investments have been
undertaken is particularly concerning given the number of land deals
that have been concluded since the turn of the twenty-first century1 and
the growing willingness of investors to have recourse to investor-state
arbitration.2 As host governments are increasingly encouraged to ensure

that land-based investments are responsible, they will more frequently
confront the thorny question of how to deal with problems stemming
from existing investments, particularly in light of their legal obligations.
This report provides practical solutions for host governments that
have already granted or facilitated large-scale land-based investments
for agricultural or forestry projects,3 and that subsequently seek to
address land grievances arising from them. In particular, it aims to
assist governments to resolve such grievances pragmatically while also
fulfilling their legal obligations under human rights law and minimizing
potential liability under international investment law and investor-state
contracts. The report may also be of interest to other stakeholders;
these include: bilateral aid agencies and multilateral organizations
interested in sustainable investments, civil society groups and communities advocating for better protection of their rights, investors striving
to resolve grievances and align with best practices, lawyers working
with any of these stakeholders, arbitrators seeking to understand the
wider context of investment disputes, and researchers focused on
land-based investments.
The report is based on legal research, a survey of reported grievances
arising from agricultural or forestry projects, and expert interviews.4
Part I provides an overview of land-based investments and the grievances that arise from them. Part II explores governments’ competing
obligations under different legal frameworks that may constrain or
influence their actions toward investors and those affected by investments: in particular, obligations arising from investment law, human
rights law, and investor-state contracts. Part III describes various
options that governments can take to address land grievances. These
are grouped into two categories: specific actions to address distinct
grievances related to a particular investment, and general steps to
implement more systemic change or minimize potential liability under
investment treaties more broadly.5
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PART I. CONTEXT

LAND-BASED
INVESTMENTS
AND ASSOCIATED
GRIEVANCES
Large-scale land-based investments for agricultural or forestry
projects have been of sustained interest to a number of host governments, as well as investors. This is by no means a new phenomenon;
some agricultural concession agreements still in operation in Liberia,
for example, were signed in the 1950s. Yet a noticeable increase in
international investments since the mid-2000s, and particularly
after the 2007-2008 food price crisis, has led to what academics and
advocates alike have described as a “global land rush.” Investors
have been interested in such transactions primarily for commercial
motives, although at times have been driven by other reasons, such as
food security concerns. Certain governments, particularly in low- and
middle-income countries, have sought such investment in order to
increase capital flows, create jobs, enable technology transfer, or
catalyze more productive agricultural operations.
Evidence suggests that the scale of these land-based investments is
not as high as frequently described,6 and that their pace has slowed in
recent years.7 Nuances have also been lost in reporting around these
investments: the role of national investors and medium-scale investments, for example, has often been overlooked in favor of the international and the large-scale. Moreover, given the difficulties inherent in
agricultural projects, some investments made during the past decade
have already failed, while many others have never been implemented.
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Whether the pace of land-based investments will pick up again
is unclear, although the factors that drove previous interest
continue to be in play. Growing populations with more resource-intensive diets and lifestyles, as well as the impact of
climate variability on agricultural yields, will continue to exert
demand for crops that provide food, fuel, and other products.
Private sector interest (both international and domestic) persists,
and some host governments continue to tout the agricultural
sector as a prime investment opportunity. Land, and the water that
comes with it to make it arable,8 are finite resources in a planet
with a growing appetite.
Regardless of overall future prospects either at a global scale or
in any specific country, many land-based investments have already
been undertaken. Governments that host significant investment
thus face the challenge of ensuring that expected benefits materialize while also addressing any negative consequences that occur.
The choices they make to do so may, at times, render it difficult to
comply with their relevant legal obligations, as this report explains.
Part I provides context for the report by describing the grievances
that can arise from land-based investments, the benefits for both
governments and investors of addressing such grievances, and the
difficulties that governments may encounter in doing so.

LAND GRIEVANCES
Land-based investments have given rise to scores of grievances around
the world.9 The reasons for such grievances are varied, ranging from
the failure of promised benefits to materialize to forced evictions,
violence, and even killings. They have arisen when the transferred land
was provided by the government, as well as when land was provided
by the community or individuals. Grievances also emerge at various
stages of the project cycle, from before a project has been implemented to after a project has ended. While land grievances are specific
to the project and the community, the authors’ review of 40 cases of
grievances arising from agricultural or forestry projects, as well as
interviews conducted with lawyers and advocates, provides insight
into common types of grievances related to land-based investments,
as well as various measures that governments, investors, and communities have taken in response.
DISPLACEMENT AND
RELATED GRIEVANCES
Displacement from land, along with related issues, represents
one of the most common grievances arising from land-based investments. This includes displacement from land on which individuals
were living, as well as from land on which individuals had relied
for farming, gathering of resources (such as for food, medicine,
or building materials), or other activities upon which livelihoods
depended. It covers physical displacement, for example, relocation,
as well as economic displacement, such as losing access to assets
necessary for livelihoods.10 Related issues include a lack of consultation or free, prior, and informed consent before displacement;
a failure to provide sufficient (or any) compensation for such
displacement; and forced evictions.
Given the significance of land for many people from an economic,
social, political, cultural, and sometimes spiritual perspective, it is not
BOX 1: INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
VERSUS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT:
A FALSE DICHOTOMY?
This report focuses primarily on foreign investments, as international investment treaties that protect foreign investors raise
important considerations for governments seeking to address
land grievances. However, many of the same issues and options
are relevant in the case of domestic investments. Regardless of
whether an investment is foreign or domestic, governments are
still bound by a range of legal obligations arising from international human rights law, domestic law, and, when applicable,
investor-state contracts. In instances where domestic investments
give rise to land grievances, governments will still want to address
them, including by using the solutions described in this report.
The lines between domestic investment and international
investment are often blurred. Many international investors incorporate an entity in the jurisdiction in which they are investing in
order to receive various benefits or meet certain requirements.
A company that does this can likely still be considered a foreign
investor for the purposes of any dispute related to the investment.11 At the same time, domestic investors have in some cases
managed to obtain investment treaty protection meant for foreign
investors by establishing a corporate entity in a foreign country
and then routing their investments through that entity and back
to the host country.

surprising that displacement from land constitutes a key grievance tied
to land-based investments. While governments may consider certain
land to be “available” for investment, this designation does not mean
that the land is not used or relied on by communities and individuals,
as evidenced by the resettlement provisions included in some investor-state contracts. And while much has been made of “underutilized”
land ready for investment, research has shown that investments are
likely to be made on densely or moderately populated and accessible
land, including croplands, rangelands, and fallow agricultural land.12
Physical displacement due to a government’s provision of land to an
investor is sometimes accompanied by allegations of forced evictions,
often without consent, consultation, or adequate compensation. The
numbers can be staggering, with investments sometimes displacing
thousands of individuals.13
The provision of land directly by communities or individuals, rather
than the government, may also lead to grievances linked to the resulting
displacement. An agreement reached between an investor and a community leader, for example, may not have been representative of all community members’ interests. Some individuals, meanwhile, have claimed that
they were intimidated into providing investors with rights to use their
land, or had not properly understood the agreement they reached with
an investor. And even when individuals have willingly provided land,
they may subsequently regret this upon realizing that the payment or
benefits they received were insufficient to compensate for the land they
have given up. This, too, can engender grievances.
Other grievances linked to displacement from land or resources relate
to the correlated negative impacts when such displacement occurs.
Particularly when compensation is not adequate, displacement disrupts
livelihoods and has a serious impact on wellbeing. Among other effects,
such disruption can reduce food security for displaced individuals.
Displacement may also decrease access to services, either physically
or economically, with displaced individuals noting negative impacts
on education and health. Even when displacement is accompanied by
adequate compensation and access to services, it can disrupt social
networks and patterns in ways that negatively affect displaced individuals and their communities.

BOX 2: MAJOR GAPS IN THE
RECOGNITION OF COMMUNITY LAND
Many people are particularly vulnerable to displacement due
to the limited formal recognition of community land across the
globe. Researchers estimate that communities “hold as much as
65 percent of the world’s land area through customary, community-based tenure systems,” but that “governments only recognize
formal, legal rights of Indigenous Peoples and local communities
to a fraction of these lands.”14 While some governments have begun
to take steps to increase formal recognition of community land, the
current gaps have likely facilitated the granting of concessions that
cause individuals and communities to be displaced from the land
and resources on which they rely.15 Moreover, adequate compensation for physical or economic displacement from communal land
or resources may be less likely when the land has not been formally
recognized by the government.16
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NEGATIVE EFFECTS ON THE ENVIRONMENT
OR CULTURAL SITES
Closely tied to displacement is the impact that investment operations
may have on the environment or on cultural sites. Investment projects
may harm the environment by their very design—for example, multiple
communities have raised grievances related to the destruction of
forests for palm oil projects—or as a result of inattention to environmental impacts and failure to mitigate related risks. Pollution or
diversion of water resources is a particularly concerning impact, with
some grievances stemming from a lack of safe drinking water due to
an investment. Grievances also can arise when cultural sites, such as
ancestral graves, are destroyed, or when access is restricted due to
project operations.
FAILURE TO REALIZE
BENEFITS FROM PROJECTS
Another recurrent set of grievances relates to project-affected individuals’ or communities’ belief that they have not received appropriate
benefits from the project, or the benefits that had been promised.
Some common benefits that communities expect relate to jobs, local
infrastructure, provision of education or electricity, or local content,
such as commitments to purchase certain supplies or services from the
local community. These benefits may have been described by the
government or by the investor. They are sometimes noted in a
document, such as a Memorandum of Understanding, signed with the
community or with individuals. More frequently, they may have been
discussed orally. In places where oral contracts are a traditional way
to make an agreement, grievances may be particularly high when oral
promises are not fulfilled, leaving community members to feel they
have been deceived.17
Grievances about jobs are two-fold. The first concern is often that
there are simply not as many jobs as had been promised, or as may
be needed to offset the loss of livelihoods resulting from the investment. In some cases, jobs are provided to workers from outside of the
community, which may give rise to grievances when local communities
expected to benefit from such jobs. In other cases, jobs may be provided
to some subset of local workers to the detriment of others. The second
concern relates to working conditions, as well as wages. Workers may
find that the jobs that have materialized are not satisfactory—the wages
may not be adequate to meet their needs, the hours may be difficult to
combine with their own farming efforts, or the working conditions may
be harsh, without the shoes, safety equipment, or other materials that
were promised or are necessary.
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BOX 3: WHAT ABOUT ILLEGAL
OR INVALID CONCESSIONS?
Concerns have been raised in multiple countries that certain
land-based investments and their governing agreements fail
to comply with domestic legal requirements. For example, in
Cambodia, government officials have granted economic land
concessions that have not met requisite pre-conditions, that
exceed legal size limits, or that otherwise run contrary to applicable laws.18 In Papua New Guinea, a Commission of Inquiry investigating Special Agriculture & Business Leases found that multiple
leases failed to comply with statutory requirements, and ultimately
recommended replacing the entire system of leases due to serious
abuses.19 When government entities have granted concessions that
do not meet all legal requirements or that are otherwise invalid,
another government entity—from the executive, legislative, or
judicial branch—might subsequently determine that the concession is invalid under domestic law, and may cancel or modify it.
While such steps can assist in ensuring compliance under domestic
law, an investor might then raise a claim that such cancellation
or modification breaches the government’s obligations under an
investment treaty.

cycle can lead to violence on both ends—from disaffected community
members and from the investor, the government, or security forces
controlled by either—and can result in a tragic loss of life,20 including
of innocent bystanders.21
ILLEGALITY, CORRUPTION,
AND LACK OF TRANSPARENCY
Yet another set of grievances arising from land-based investments relate
to concerns about whether an investment complies with relevant legal
requirements, whether the investment was tainted by corruption or
conflicts of interest, and the level of transparency around the investment. These issues may not be the proximate cause of concerns related
to an investment—individuals or communities are more likely to first
take issue with an investment because of the direct negative impacts
on their lives—but they can engender significant additional frustration
about a project. These issues may also be raised in advocacy against the
investment, or in legal actions or non-judicial complaints procedures.

VIOLENCE AND OTHER INFRINGEMENTS
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS

BENEFITS OF ADDRESSING
LAND GRIEVANCES

In some places, land-based investments have been associated with
violence, ranging from physical assaults to killings. This may be coupled
with intimidation, as well as other infringements on civil and political
rights, including repression of protests and inappropriate detentions
or arrests. These acts, which provoke grievances from individuals or
communities, are often reactions to the expression of grievances. They
are part of a downward spiral, whereby investments create grievances,
individuals or communities raise these grievances through protest or
other action, the investor or the government takes steps to clamp down
on the resulting actions through arrests or violence, and these steps
provoke even greater grievances on the part of the affected individuals
or communities. At the most extreme, this negatively reinforcing

Host governments and investors alike have good reasons to address
grievances related to land-based investments. Land grievances often
stem from serious impacts on lives and livelihoods. Given their
significant implications, such grievances have triggered a number of
actions by individuals and communities, including protests, legal cases,
and international advocacy campaigns. In some cases, land grievances
have also led to the destruction of property or have instigated violent
conflict. These responses to grievances create risks for both the investor
and the government that point to the practical benefits of addressing
grievances as they arise in order to mitigate, rather than exacerbate,
their impacts.
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Indeed, while some host governments, or entities within host governments, may be driven to address grievances by genuine concern for
the most vulnerable of their citizens, others may believe that the advantages associated with land-based investments are worth the tradeoffs that they entail. Yet addressing grievances ultimately benefits the
country as a whole. This includes providing economic benefits—for
instance, minimizing potential conflict can make the country a more
attractive destination for investors22—as well as broader benefits,
such as supporting greater democratic responsiveness.
Investors likewise have incentives to minimize the grievances that
arise from an investment. First and foremost, grievances can harm the
investor’s “social license to operate,” which is often as valuable as any
regulatory license needed for operations.23 Given the importance of
this social license, as well as the potential reputational and legal risks
tied to land grievances, investors can also benefit from addressing
concerns, or facilitating the host government’s efforts to do so.

OBSTACLES IN ADDRESSING
LAND GRIEVANCES
Even though, in theory, all stakeholders may have strong reasons to
address land grievances, government entities can confront substantial
obstacles in their pursuit of remedies. These include a lack of clarity
over the best solution for any particular situation, opposition within
or outside of the government, and legally enforceable commitments
that are in tension with possible remedies that a government
might implement.
Grievances that are easy to articulate may be hard to resolve. In
some cases, there may be no way to fully remedy what has already
occurred. The destruction of a sacred site, or razing of forested
land that had provided important resources, for example, cannot
be undone. In other cases, there may be disagreements within the
aggrieved community regarding the remedies they seek. Some people,
for instance, may be willing to receive in-kind compensation for
their land, while others may refuse any shift in land access. The lack
of clear solutions for a particular situation may increase community
opposition to any proposed step to address grievances.
Opposition to government action can also come from within the
government itself. Certain government entities may be more inclined
to address the grievances arising from a land-based investment than
others. National development strategies, for example, might conflict
with the policies and priorities of local governments. Parliamentarians
might have different opinions on the benefits of an investment than
the executive branch, while the part of the executive branch mandated
to protect the environment might view an investment quite differently from the part charged with attracting investment. A government
entity thus may find itself constrained by other government actors in
its attempts to address grievances.
A government might also confront an investor that is unwilling to
change its operations to help mitigate related grievances. This may
place the government in the unenviable position of trying to placate
its citizens as well as the investor. In addition, home governments
at times reinforce pressure on the host government to act favorably
towards the investor, rendering efforts to address grievances at the
expense of the investor even more difficult.

BOX 4: THE ROLE OF
HOME GOVERNMENTS
Governments of countries from which outward investment flows
(“home governments”) play a complicated role in the context of
land-based investments and related grievances. Home governments often provide diplomatic, economic, or other support for
investors that are based or headquartered in their country and
undertaking outward investment. Some governments have proved
willing to provide such support even in the face of alleged social or
environmental harms caused by the investor.
Yet governments’ obligations under human rights law arguably
have extraterritorial reach, which may require home governments
to regulate outward investors to ensure that their actions do not
negatively affect human rights.24 Apart from legal obligations,
home governments have other reasons for seeking to ensure that
outward investments are implemented responsibly, including
increasing policy coherency or complying with the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights.25
Home government measures to promote more responsible
investment can help prevent or mitigate land grievances arising
from outward investment. Such measures include:
öö Regulating the actions of outward investors;26
öö Conditioning diplomatic or financial support for outward
investors on compliance with certain standards
or processes; and
öö Establishing disclosure requirements for outward investment
that encourage more responsible conduct by investors.

The legally enforceable commitments made by a host government
to the investor also present an obstacle to redressing grievances.
Through investor-state contracts, for example, host governments
generally provide the investor with a set of rights that are legally
enforceable. This can constrain options. Restitution of land, for
instance, may be difficult when an investor with rights to the land in
question opposes such a measure. In addition to the rights provided
via contracts, licenses, or other domestic authorizations, governments
also are bound by a web of international and domestic legal obligations, including obligations to protect human rights, and, for most
governments, obligations to protect the rights of foreign investors.
These legal obligations can also affect the options available to governments, as discussed in Parts II and III.
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PART II

LEGAL FRAMEWORKS,
OBLIGATIONS,
AND CONSTRAINTS
Governments operate in the context of international and domestic laws, and are also bound by the contracts
into which they enter. These legal frameworks and agreements generally create legally binding obligations.
Such obligations are enforceable through different mechanisms and to varying degrees.27 They constrain
how governments can or should act, delineating remedies for when governments breach their corresponding
duties. In the context of land grievances, the legal obligations incumbent on a host government may influence
its actions vis-à-vis investors and those who are affected by investors’ actions.
This Part provides a brief overview of these legal frameworks and obligations, and their relevance to the
choices host governments make to address land grievances. The interaction between these legal obligations
can be complex, and this discussion also highlights some of the ways in which obligations may affect or
conflict with each other.
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LAWS AND
CONTRACTS
Governments are bound by an intricate web of legal obligations.
These include obligations that arise from international investment
law and international human rights law, as well as from domestic law
and, when applicable, investor-state contracts.
When it comes to investments in agriculture or forestry, two bodies
of international law are especially important for host governments.
International investment law, established primarily through bilateral
investment treaties and other trade and investment treaties, regulates
a host government’s treatment of foreign investors. Human rights law,
codified in international instruments at the international or regional
level, provides a set of rights that governments must seek to protect,
respect, and fulfill. Traditionally, both investment law and human
rights law create binding legal obligations for governments, but not for
investors. In addition to international law, domestic law also creates
legal obligations, generally for both governments and investors. When
used, investor-state contracts are an additional source of
legal obligations.
INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW
International investment law is a powerful force. Of the more than
3,000 existing international investment treaties, most provide foreign
investors with a direct private right of action to sue their “host”
governments in international arbitration, generally without having to
exhaust domestic remedies (i.e., first seek remedies under national law
in a domestic court). Investor-state arbitration provides a relatively
easy path to bring a legal challenge. If the government is found to
have violated an investment treaty, the investment arbitration panel
established to hear the dispute (typically three arbitrators) usually
awards monetary damages, which may cover both past losses and lost
future profits. Some awards have been for staggering sums—in 2014,
for example, the Russian government was ordered to pay over US$50
billion in compensation. Even if a government ultimately prevails in an
arbitration, it may be forced to expend significant time and resources
in defending the claim.28 Consequently, a government that is wary of
arbitration claims may decline to address land grievances in a way that
interferes with an investment, even in circumstances in which the public
interest would justify or even require such interference.
International investment treaties may be relevant even when not
anticipated by a host government, as corporations can sometimes
maneuver to gain protection of an investment treaty that would
otherwise not apply.29 Some investment arbitration tribunals have
even permitted nationals of the host state to obtain treaty protection
by “roundtripping”—i.e., establishing a corporate entity in a foreign
country and routing investments from the host state through the foreign
entity back to the host state.30 Complicating matters further, some
tribunals have determined that even indirect and minority non-controlling shareholders can initiate arbitrations, potentially exposing the
government to multiple suits arising out of the same underlying issue.31
Moreover, even if a company’s management or majority shareholders
settle or decide to not bring a claim, other arbitrations may still be
brought by minority shareholders in the company.

International investment treaties commonly contain a core set of
obligations regulating governments’ conduct. These include:
öö Two non-discrimination provisions, the national treatment obligation and the most-favored nation obligation, which prohibit intentional discrimination against foreign investors on account of the
investors’ nationality. According to some tribunals, these obligations
also prevent unintentional discrimination. Some treaties apply these
obligations on a pre-establishment basis, meaning that governments
commit to granting protected investors rights to establish investments on the same terms as domestic individuals and entities (or
any other foreign individual or entity).
Government measures that could trigger investment arbitration
claims under the non-discrimination obligations include:
»» The provision of subsidies to domestic but not foreign-owned
firms (intentional discrimination)
»» A regulation preventing foreigners from purchasing land
(intentional discrimination)
»» The provision of subsidies to farms under a certain size
(resulting in unintentional discrimination).
In addition, using the most-favored nation obligation, tribunals
have allowed investors covered by a treaty between its home
state and the host state to “import” favorable protections and dispute
settlement provisions from other treaties concluded by the host state.
This allows the investor to select the most investor-friendly aspects
of different treaties, and bring those different aspects together to
create a new “super-treaty” to protect the investor’s interests.
Importantly, some international investment treaties include exceptions to these non-discrimination obligations, which can be used for
diverse policy aims. Such objectives might include preventing foreign
ownership of certain investments and assets (for instance, land), or
ensuring that governments can comply with other legal obligations
(for example, permitting governments to accord special legal rights to
indigenous peoples within their territories). Some governments have
also included language in their international investment treaties clarifying that investors cannot use the most-favored nation obligation to
“import” substantive standards from other investment treaties.
öö The obligation to provide compensation for expropriations of
an investor’s property.32 This has been interpreted to require governments to compensate for both direct expropriations, like outright
seizure of property, and indirect expropriations, such as policy
measures that destroy the economic value of an investment. While
direct expropriations are relatively easy to identify, disputes often
arise regarding whether a government regulation or other measure
constitutes an “indirect” expropriation. Because it is difficult to
distinguish between legitimate regulatory measures negatively
affecting property rights and indirect expropriations, some more
recent agreements have included additional text to guide tribunals
on this point.
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Government measures that could trigger claims under the expropriation provision include:
»» A regulation requiring that local communities be granted rights of
transit across investors’ land
»» Measures restricting use of water
»» A court order invalidating an investor-state concession contract
öö The fair and equitable treatment (FET) obligation, which is the
standard upon which investors most frequently prevail. Government
conduct that lacks the severity necessary to amount to an expropriation may still be deemed a violation of the FET obligation. Infamously
vague, the FET obligation has been subject to a wide range of interpretations that can be broken into two general groups. Under one, FET
is a minimum standard of treatment that governments must provide
to foreign investors; under the other, FET imposes more extensive
procedural and substantive obligations, including to not frustrate or
interfere with investors’ “legitimate expectations.”
Although this appears innocuous, the ways in which the FET obligation has been applied raise significant concerns for governments, and
can affect the nature and scope of investor rights. For instance, some
tribunals have interpreted it to allow investors to rely on and enforce
otherwise non-binding statements by government officials.33 Government conduct that interferes with an investor’s expectations generated by those non-binding statements can then result in liability. (Box
5 provides one example of how an investment arbitration tribunal
found that the government violated the investors’ “legitimate expectations” relating to their asserted property rights.)
Government measures that could trigger claims under the FET
obligation include:
»» Most actions that would also give rise to claims of expropriation
or violations of non-discrimination obligations
»» A federal government representation that a land-based investment
would be allowed, which later turned out to be untrue in light of
local community opposition
öö The full protection and security (FPS) obligation, which provides
foreign investors and investments a measure of protection against
harms caused by non-governmental actors (and, according to some
investment arbitration tribunals, government actors as well).
Some tribunals have interpreted the FPS standard to protect against

any harm, including harm caused by changes in the host government’s legal framework. Other tribunals have interpreted the obligation more narrowly to protect only against physical harm. According
to this narrower interpretation, governments are only required to
exercise due diligence in providing foreign investors and their investments a normal, non-discriminatory level of police protection. Some
more modern model agreements and treaties have specified that FPS
only refers to protection against physical harm.34
Government measures that could trigger claims under the FPS
standard include:
»» A failure to evict alleged trespassers or squatters from the
investor’s land
»» A failure to stop protests interfering with the investor’s operations
öö The “umbrella clause,” which is more common in older investment
treaties35 and varies in both its wording and interpretation. In some
cases, and depending on the text and tribunal, umbrella clauses have
been interpreted relatively narrowly, requiring a government to
comply with written contractual obligations entered into with the
foreign investor. In other cases, umbrella clauses have been interpreted more broadly, requiring a government to comply with any
obligation it has assumed under domestic or international law that
benefits the investor. According to some tribunals, an umbrella clause
will only be breached if the government was acting in its “sovereign”
capacity when it violated its obligation to the investor (for example,
passing a law invalidating an underlying contract). The majority of
tribunals, however, have found that a government can also breach
the umbrella clause if it was acting as a normal contracting party (for
example, failing to comply with its duty to make payments under
the contract).
Government measures that could trigger claims under the
umbrella clause include:
»» Efforts to seek renegotiation of an investor-state contract
»» A court decision that a stabilization clause in an investor-state
contract is invalid
»» A government entity’s breach of its contractual obligations
to the investor

BOX 5: TURNING EXPECTATIONS INTO PROPERTY RIGHTS:
THE AWDI V. ROMANIA CASE
Under the FET obligation, some investor-state arbitration tribunals
have effectively allowed investors to transform their “legitimate
expectations” into enforceable property rights, even if such rights
do not exist under domestic law. The Awdi v. Romania case,36 for
example, centered on two decisions by the Constitutional Court
of Romania, which had determined that property rights claimed by
the investors regarding two discrete investments were invalid. The
Court’s first decision had invalidated title to a piece of contested
land; the second had found unconstitutional a national law granting
the investors a 49-year concession for lands rented from various local
governments. In a subsequent action brought by the investors against
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Romania under an investment treaty, the arbitration tribunal did
not find fault with the Constitutional Court’s process or decisions.
Nevertheless, the tribunal determined that the investors’ legitimate
expectations had been breached and must be compensated. In this
way, the Constitutional Court’s authoritative determination over
the validity of the property rights under domestic law resulted in
a breach of the government’s FET obligation. Romania was thus
ordered to compensate the investors €7.7 million for damages,
with additional payments to cover the investors’ legal fees and
related expenses.

Each of the obligations described above has ramifications for the governance of existing land-based investments and governments’ options
for addressing related grievances. Despite these implications, however,
it is difficult—and arguably inappropriate (see Box 10)—for host states
to shape their conduct in a way that fully avoids all potential risks.
Investment arbitration tribunals are not bound to follow the decisions
of previous cases, which means that tribunals in pending and future
cases have broad latitude to adopt different interpretations. This lack of
precedent, coupled with vague treaty language and differing interpretations by arbitration tribunals, renders it difficult to declare definitively
what any one obligation requires. Thus, assessing in advance what types
of conduct will and will not give rise to claims of breach is a nearly
impossible task, and predicting whether those claims will be successful
can be equally challenging.
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW
In the context of land-based investments, international human rights
law and the obligations thereunder will often create countervailing
pressures for governments. Whereas international investment law
obliges governments to provide certain protections to investors,
international human rights law sets out protections for individuals
and peoples, including those who risk being negatively affected by
investments.37 Compared to international investment law, human rights
law is far less fragmented: rather than the thousands of investment
treaties, there are fewer than a dozen core human rights treaties at
the international level,38 supplemented by other relevant multilateral
treaties (such as International Labour Organization Conventions)39
and regional human rights treaties in Africa, the Americas, and Europe.
Instead of the dispute-specific tribunals created under investment
treaties, human rights redress mechanisms are provided through more
established forums. These include regional human rights courts,
BOX 6: RIGHTS VIOLATIONS TIED TO EVICTIONS:
THE ENDOROIS CASE
This decision by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights concerned the Kenyan government’s eviction of hundreds
of families belonging to the indigenous Endorois people from
their ancestral lands to create game reserves for tourism, and to
grant concessions for forestry and mining.40 The Endorois were
not properly consulted or compensated, and were prevented from
accessing the land and resources needed for traditional medicines.
The Commission found that the government had violated the
community’s rights to religion and culture by restricting access to
the land and impeding the Endorois’ traditional pastoralist way
of life. The community’s right to property, and its right to freely
dispose of its wealth and natural resources, were also found to
have been violated by restricting the Endorois’ access to the land
and resources. Finally, the Commission found that the government
violated the community’s right to development, given the community’s lack of involvement in the process of developing the region
for tourism. The Commission recommended that the government
recognize the Endorois’ ownership of the land, and return the land
to them. It also recommended that the government pay compensation for additional losses, and ensure that the community benefit
from any royalties and employment opportunities generated from
existing economic activities on the land.

regional human rights commissions, and complaints mechanisms tied to
specific treaties.
These human rights fora differ from investment arbitration processes
in two important ways. They generally require claimants to first exhaust
available domestic remedies. In addition, the remedies awarded by
human rights tribunals are not usually in the form of monetary damages;
even when monetary awards are provided, the high sums seen in investment law disputes are not common in human rights judgments.41
States that have ratified human rights treaties have corresponding
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights codified
therein.42 Specifically, this means that they must refrain from violating
those rights, prevent third parties from violating those rights, and take
steps to progressively realize those rights (this latter point is generally
more applicable to economic, social, and cultural rights). In addition
to binding treaties, soft law instruments, such as U.N. declarations and
widely endorsed guidelines, help in interpreting human rights law.
The human rights most commonly affected by land-based investments
can be loosely grouped into three categories: human rights tied to land
occupation and use; other human rights at risk for those living on, near,
or downstream from concession areas; and human rights of employees
and contractors. These include:
öö The right to property, which includes the right not to be arbitrarily
deprived of property. This right can generally be limited for actions
that are “in the public interest.” Whether a land-based investment can
be considered in the public interest may depend on the context and
jurisdiction, as described in Box 17.
öö The prohibition of forced eviction, which forbids the coerced or
involuntary displacement of individuals or communities from their
home or lands without appropriate protection. A government that
undertakes or fails to prevent forced evictions related to a land-based
investment may violate a range of legally protected human rights,
including the right to adequate housing.43
öö The right to free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC), which
requires governments to consult and cooperate in good faith with
indigenous peoples to obtain their FPIC before: relocating them;
approving any project affecting their lands, territories, or resources; or
adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that
may affect them. Government measures that violate this right include
allowing a land-based investment to displace indigenous peoples
without their consent, regardless of whether such peoples hold formal
title to the land. Such an action might also violate the right of minorities to enjoy their own culture, which includes protections of land
use or ownership where the culture is closely tied to the land.
öö The right to water, which protects individuals’ access to existing water
supplies, and includes the right to be free from interference, such as
from arbitrary disconnections or contamination of water supplies. A
land-based investment that diverts or pollutes water relied on by local
individuals or communities thus might give rise to a violation of their
right to water.
öö The right to food, which is realized when an individual has uninterrupted physical and economic access to adequate food, or to the means
for procuring adequate food, such as access to land and other productive resources. When a government allows an investor to displace
people from land on which they had relied for access to food, it is
failing protect the right to food.
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öö The right to health, which contains both entitlements and freedoms,
such as the right to control one’s health and body, and the right to
be free from interference. A land-based investment that directly or
indirectly contributes to poor health can affect this right for workers
or local communities. Such practices might also affect their right to a
healthy environment, which includes the right to live in an environment adequate for health and wellbeing.
öö The right to self-determination, which includes the right of peoples
to freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources. Land-based
investments that deprive peoples of their access to productive
resources might infringe on this right.
öö The right to life, which must be protected by law, and the right to
liberty and security of person, which prohibits arbitrary arrest or
detention. In addition, there is a right to peaceful assembly, which
includes the right to participate in peaceful meetings or protests,
as well as the right to freedom of expression, which covers the
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information (including a right
of access to information held by public bodies). In the context of
land-based investments, these rights are sometimes at risk when the
government or private security forces respond to efforts by community members or land rights defenders to draw attention to negative
impacts of an investment.
öö The right to just and favorable conditions of work, which includes
requirements for fair wages and safe and healthy working conditions.
Additionally, the right to form and join trade unions and the right
to freedom of association cover workers’ rights to join unions to
protect their interests. In some contexts, a government might fail
to ensure that these rights are respected in the operation of
land-based investments.
Government obligations related to these rights also have important
implications for how governments address land grievances. While the
BOX 7: OTHER INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
In addition to obligations under investment law and human rights
law, governments have obligations under other types of international law, such as international environmental law and international humanitarian law, which might in some cases affect
resolution of a land grievance. For example:
öö States party to the Convention on Biological Diversity are bound
to respect and maintain environmentally beneficial knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and other local
communities practicing traditional lifestyles, and to do so with
their approval and involvement.
öö Individuals displaced during armed conflict have a right to
voluntary return in safety, with the government’s assistance,
to their homes or places of habitual residence as soon as the
reasons for their displacement cease to exist. The property of
displaced individuals, and of civilians more generally, must not
be destroyed or appropriated as part of a reprisal or collective
punishment.44
öö During armed conflict, governments must protect cultural
property (defined as “movable or immovable property of great
importance to the cultural heritage of every people”), which can
include archaeological sites, such as indigenous burial sites and
places of worship.45
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content of many of these human rights and corresponding governmental obligations are subject to fewer divergences in interpretation
than in investment law, there remains confusion on the part of some
government entities about what these rights require. The right to food,
for example, does not equate to a general right to be fed, but it does
require a government to refrain from interfering with existing access
to food (or the resources used to obtain it) and to prevent third parties
from doing so. Thus, a more thorough understanding of what such
obligations entail can help governments in addressing grievances in a
way that complies with their legal obligations under human rights law.
DOMESTIC
LAW
Domestic laws and regulations are also relevant for host governments
seeking to take action on land grievances. These domestic legal frameworks shape how land-based investments are undertaken and regulated,
providing processes and rules to be followed. For instance, a law might
describe the incentives to be offered to investors, prevent foreigners
from purchasing certain types of land, or set out the authorizations
required to receive a forestry permit. Individuals claiming breach of a
domestic law generally seek redress through domestic courts. A court
might, for example, assess the legality of a land concession under
domestic law.
Depending on the jurisdiction, there may be specific laws regulating
investments or protecting human rights. Some of these laws provide
greater protection—of investments, or of human rights—than at the
international level. For example, a domestic investment law might
expand the opportunities for investment dispute procedures beyond
what an investor would receive under an applicable investment treaty.
In turn, a domestic human rights law might set forth more specific
obligations that a government must follow. One distinction from international law is that domestic law frequently also creates obligations for
investors, rather than just for governments.
INVESTOR-STATE
CONTRACTS
In countries where the government sells, leases, or otherwise grants
access to land for agricultural or forestry projects, investor-state
contracts may be used. These contracts allocate risk between
contracting parties and delineate a range of rights and obligations.

BOX 8: ROLE OF THE DOMESTIC COURT:
EXAMPLE FROM PAPUA NEW GUINEA
In 2012, a Malaysian investor acquired, through acquisitions of
another company, two Special Agriculture & Business Leases
in Papua New Guinea for over 38,000 hectares of land, which it
planned to use for oil palm plantations.46 Communities protested
these plans, and claimed that they were customary owners of the
land in question. Plaintiffs representing the affected communities
sought judicial review of the leases, claiming that the procedures
established by law to obtain the leases were not followed.47 The
National Court of Papua New Guinea issued an interim injunction
restraining activities on the land, and the leases were subsequently
quashed. The investor stated in an announcement that it would
comply with the related Order, and also noted that “without the
acceptance and co-operation of the customary land owners …,
there will be no end to challenges over [its] right to operate ….”48

Investor-state contracts differ in their complexity, as well as in their
purported comprehensiveness.
Investor-state contracts sometimes include a stabilization clause
addressing how changes in the law of the host state will affect the
contract. Stabilization clauses can be framed broadly, as applying to
all domestic laws, or narrowly, applying only to certain topics (for
example, tax laws). There are three general categories of
stabilization clauses:
öö Freezing clauses specify that the law in effect on the day that a
contract is signed will apply to the investment for the life of the
project regardless of any subsequent changes in law.
öö Economic equilibrium clauses require an investor to comply with
new laws, but oblige the host state to compensate the investor for
any loss incurred in doing so.
öö Hybrid clauses are a combination of freezing clauses and
economic equilibrium clauses.49
Although stabilization clauses are discouraged by the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises,50 some investors continue to seek them
in the hopes of insulating the investment from unpredictable and costly
changes in domestic laws. As explained below, such clauses interact
with international investment law and international human rights law
in various ways.
Investor-state contracts generally define the process to be used in
addressing disputes arising out of or in connection with the contract.
Many provide for commercial arbitration under the same or similar
rules that govern arbitration arising out of investment treaties; as with
investment arbitration, these commercial arbitrations often occur
outside of the host country. Thus, while only an investor can bring a
claim for breach of an investment treaty obligation, either the investor
or the government can bring a claim under commercial arbitration for
breach of a contractual obligation.

INTERACTION BETWEEN
LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
Governments’ legal obligations interact in complex ways, and can
even conflict with each other. For example, investor-state contracts
are generally subordinate to domestic law, but can be essentially
elevated above domestic law by an international investment treaty.
Investment treaties have also been interpreted in a way that
effectively creates new property rights that might not exist under
domestic law. At the same time, an investor-state contract can
potentially create obligations that conflict with a government’s obligations under international human rights law, while a government’s
obligations under an investment treaty and under relevant human
rights treaties may also be in tension.
Governments’ obligations under these different legal frameworks and
agreements interact in various and complex ways. They may, at times,
also conflict.
Investor-state contracts, for example, are generally subordinate to
domestic law. However, to the extent that a stabilization clause has
been included in the contract, the contracting parties seek to circumvent relevant changes in the domestic law, excepting the investor from
having to comply with or incur the costs of those changes. This may be

acceptable in some jurisdictions. Yet it may not be allowed in others,
where a court might deem such a clause to be invalid and unenforceable on grounds that it violates the constitutional separation of powers
or improperly restricts the government’s power to act in the public
interest. Additionally, investor-state contracts may seek to create a
particular legal regime that differs from what would originally apply
under domestic law. Some contracts, for example, provide for particular
methods of dispute settlement, and purport to impose specialized rules
on available remedies. As with stabilization provisions, the enforceability of such provisions traditionally depends on the domestic law that
governs the contract (which is often, but not necessarily, the law of the
host state).
The rise of international investment treaties, however, has complicated the role of domestic law. One effect of these treaties is to elevate
states’ contractual commitments to investors to the international law
level, placing those commitments above—rather than subordinate
to—domestic law. Thus, even if a domestic court deems a stabilization
clause or other contractual provision invalid, an investment arbitration
tribunal asked to interpret the investor-state contract may adopt a
different view, holding the government to those promises and enforcing
them under the umbrella clause and/or fair and equitable treatment
obligation. In this way, the presence of an international investment
treaty can potentially shield a contractual clause from challenges that,
under domestic law, might have been successful.
Moreover, international investment treaties have been interpreted in
a way that effectively creates new property rights that might not exist
under domestic law. In evaluating whether the fair and equitable treatment standard was breached, some investment arbitration tribunals
have determined that investors’ rights and mere “legitimate expectations” are protected against subsequent government interference.
Under this reasoning, even if a tribunal determined that the investor
did not possess a valid property right or authorization under domestic
law, it could still conclude that the investor had formed “expectations”
that should be protected. This essentially turns these expectations into
new and enforceable property rights. Such an interpretation differs
from the traditional approach under international law, which recognizes the power of domestic systems to define whether and to what
extent a property right exists.
Astoundingly, an international investment treaty can potentially
protect an entire investor-state contract (or provisions in that
contract) that might otherwise be deemed illegal or unenforceable
under domestic law. This is less likely when the illegal nature of the
contract is severe: some tribunals, for example, have determined that
they do not have the power to hear claims brought by investors that
have secured their contracts through corruption or fraud. Yet tribunals
have been less likely to dismiss cases in which contracts are illegal
on other grounds—for example, if the government entity that signed
the contract did not have the authority to do so, or if the process of
entering into the contract did not comply with necessary requirements
established by domestic law.51
Even in the absence of a stabilization clause in an investor-state
contract, some investment arbitration tribunals have determined
that promises of legal stability can be inferred from the fact that, when
the investor and government entered into their contract, the deal was
governed by a particular legal framework. Changes to that framework
could then, according to these tribunals, give rise to a violation of the
fair and equitable treatment obligation. In such a situation, an international investment treaty may also have the effect of shielding an
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investor from complying with, or requiring the government to
provide compensation for the costs of, changes in the legal framework
that negatively affect the investor, even without the parties having
explicitly agreed that the government would provide the investor
such protections.
International investment treaties are typically asymmetrical (creating
protections for investors and corresponding obligations for governments), and therefore do not have a similar impact on investors’
contractual commitments to governments. One example is found in the
context of renegotiation of investor-state contracts. Due to investment arbitration tribunal decisions interpreting the fair and equitable
treatment obligation as requiring governments to protect investors’
“legitimate expectations,” and the umbrella clause’s mandate that host
states abide by commitments made to foreign investors, host governments may be constrained in their ability to seek renegotiation. In
contrast, investors retain more freedom to request renegotiations—or
to resist renegotiation attempts by states—without incurring liability
under international law.
Given that international and regional human rights treaties are not
principally concerned with the protection of investment, they generally
do not affect commitments in investor-state contracts as investment
treaties do.52 Yet international human rights law and investor-state
contracts can potentially create conflicting obligations for governments. For example, a contract granting a concession that displaces
land users and violates their rights to food or housing would place the
government’s human rights obligations in conflict with its contractual obligations. Similarly, a broadly framed stabilization clause in an
investor-state contract may be in tension with a government’s human
rights obligations to the extent that the clause limits the applicability to
the underlying investment of new laws or policies necessary to respect,

protect, or fulfill human rights.53 When a government is party to an
investment treaty relevant for the investment, the treaty can create
an additional potential conflict, between the government’s obligations under the investment treaty and under relevant human
rights treaties.
This web of international, domestic, and contractual legal obligations can pose difficulties for governments seeking to assess their
full set of obligations, as well as to take actions to address land
grievances in a manner that complies with their relevant obligations.
To date, international tribunals have not provided much assistance
in resolving potential conflicts, tending either to avoid finding that
a conflict exists or to resolve a dispute based only on one set of legal
obligations, as noted in Box 9.

UNDERSTANDING LEGAL OBLIGATIONS
IN THE CONTEXT OF LAND GRIEVANCES
Governments’ legal obligations are relevant in their efforts to
redress land grievances. As they navigate the options at their
disposal, governments should take into account the full range of
their legal obligations.
The obligations that bind governments under these various legal
regimes and agreements raise the specter of non-compliance or
potential liability stemming from certain actions, which governments
may see as constraining their options. Two examples from different
stages in the project cycle highlight how governments’ obligations
may arise and conflict in their pursuit of addressing land grievances.
As described above, many grievances precipitated by land-based

BOX 9: HOW INTERNATIONAL BODIES HAVE TREATED CONFLICTS BETWEEN
INVESTOR PROTECTION OBLIGATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
Few human rights courts, tribunals, or expert bodies have addressed
how a conflict between a state’s human rights obligations and its
obligations under an international investment treaty should be determined. One notable exception, however, is found in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ decision in the case of Sawhoyamaxa
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (March 2006). That case focused
on Paraguay’s failure to resolve a legal claim by the Sawhoyamaxa
Indigenous Community of the Enxet-Lengua people over the
community’s ancestral lands, which had been sold by the government
to foreign investors. Paraguay argued that the land had been bought
by a German national, whose interest in the land was protected by a
“bilateral treaty”54 between Paraguay and Germany. While the Court
rejected that argument on procedural grounds, it also offered two
alternative justifications for upholding the community’s rights to
the land even when a bilateral investment treaty might be operative.
The Court’s first alternative rationale was that the bilateral investment treaty allowed for expropriation of capital investments where
necessary for a public purpose, and such a purpose could include the
restitution of ancestral land to an indigenous community. Its second
alternative rationale involved holding that the bilateral and reciprocal
nature of the investment treaty rendered it inferior to the American
Convention on Human Rights, asserting that the enforcement of
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“bilateral commercial treaties … should always be compatible with
the American Convention, which is a multilateral treaty on human
rights that stands in a class of its own and that generates rights for
individual human beings and does not depend entirely on reciprocity
among States.”55
Investment arbitration tribunals have also generally avoided
addressing conflicts between a state’s obligations under human
rights treaties and an investment treaty. While host governments
and amicus curiae have made submissions to investment arbitration tribunals asking that a government’s human rights obligations
be taken into account when assessing the scope of its obligations
and potential liabilities to foreign investors, tribunals have tended
to dismiss such arguments rather summarily. This includes by not
engaging with the arguments at all, by determining that human
rights were not in fact at risk, and/or by concluding that the government’s obligations to protect and fulfill human rights did not excuse
its obligations to comply with investment treaty commitments.
As the field of international investment law continues to evolve,
however, future investor-state arbitration decisions may give more
weight to, and become more thorough in their treatment of, human
rights arguments.

investments arise from displacement from land, whether forcible
or voluntary, and the negative consequences of such displacement.
These grievances can emerge before any displacement actually
occurs—for example, when those who stand to be displaced learn
about a project during a survey of the land taken after the investor-state contract has been signed. When the grievances are lodged,
the government may realize that the planned investment would cause
it to violate its obligations to respect or protect the human rights of
those who would be displaced, such as their rights to property, food,
water, or housing.
A government might then decide to ask the investor to first receive
the consent of potentially displaced communities before the project
proceeds. Such a request could help assuage community grievances
while also helping the government to comply with its human rights
obligations. However, the terms of the investor-state contract may
have warranted that the government was providing unencumbered
land, and may have allocated sole responsibility to the government to
resettle any settlements on the concession land that impede investor
operations. If the investor thus refuses to seek community consent, or
insists that the government must resettle individuals or communities
on the land regardless of their grievances, the government may be
limited by its contractual obligations in its options for response. If a
government nevertheless attempts to force the investor to obtain such
consent, the investor may raise arguments that such actions breach
the contract and/or obligations under an investment treaty.56 In such
a case, the government may find that its obligations under human
rights law, international investment law, and the contract are not
easy to reconcile.
Another common grievance tied to land-based investments relates
to jobs, including the creation of relatively few jobs compared to the

number promised or expected. A government concerned about
addressing these grievances might consider various strategies
for maximizing job creation, such as adopting an export ban on
non-processed timber to generate greater employment through local
processing. If investors have entered into timber contracts with the
government that include a broad stabilization clause or explicitly
provide rights to export non-processed timber, however, the new
export ban might not apply to those investors and therefore may
be of limited use. A government that nevertheless tried to enforce
such an export ban vis-à-vis such investors might be in violation of
its contractual obligations or investment treaty obligations. In such
a situation, an investor protected by an investment treaty could,
depending on the treaty language, potentially bring a claim under
a fair and equitable treatment, expropriation, or other applicable
provision. Moreover, investors in forestry operations might not
be the only corporate actors seeking an investment treaty claim
related to the export ban. For instance, the imposition of such a law
might give rise to a claim from traders who had invested in the host
country to sell non-processed timber to an export market, while
foreign processors in the host country might sue the government if
the export ban were subsequently lifted.
Understanding a government’s legal obligations in the context
of land-based investments helps in assessing its potential options
to address grievances arising from those investments. While there
are multiple options that governments can take to address such
grievances, not every option is appropriate for a given situation.
Further, a government may find that it is at times useful to undertake more than one option to address certain situations—for
example, reshaping concession boundaries in order to restitute land
to affected persons.

BOX 10: ACTING IN
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
When governments take action in the public interest, for example,
to strengthen environmental and labor laws or to regulate the use of
property rights, those actions are frequently challenged in domestic
courts by private individuals or entities as violating contractual
commitments, domestic laws, regulations, or constitutional requirements. Yet the fact that a challenge has been brought does not mean
that the government’s action was illegitimate, nor that the government should not have taken that action. Rather, such challenges are a
cost of allowing private actors to hold governments accountable for
violations of the law. Governments, however, can regulate the flow
and implications of such challenges through rules on who may sue,
on what grounds, and for what remedies.
International investment treaties provide foreign investors with
another route to challenge government action that can be used

instead of, and even in addition to, challenges under domestic law. As
long as investment treaties exist in their present form, it will be difficult if not impossible for governments to avoid claims challenging
even good faith actions taken to address public interest issues.
This report highlights the risks that arise under investment treaties in
order to provide insights into what types of conduct toward investors
are more or less likely to trigger claims and liability, as well as to help
inform treaty policy moving forward. The discussion of investment
treaties, however, is not meant to counsel governments against
taking good faith actions designed to address land grievances or
comply with human rights obligations based on the concern that, by
doing so, they may face claims or liability under investment treaties.
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PART III

OPTIONS FOR
ADDRESSING
LAND GRIEVANCES
Although land-based investments can provoke a range of grievances from local individuals or communities, a host government’s competing obligations under different legal frameworks may constrain or
influence its efforts to address such grievances. Pragmatic concerns and political considerations may also
factor into a government’s decision on how to respond: some actions may not give rise to legal liability but
could still potentially result in sub-optimal outcomes by, for instance, exacerbating tensions or damaging
a country’s reputation.
Furthermore, while there are a number of options at the disposal of a government seeking to address
land grievances, many of these options may not fully satisfy the concerns raised by communities, or may
not be appropriate for the situation at hand. A government thus must be careful both in selecting its plan
of action and in implementing it, taking steps to do so in a way that adequately manages the problems
while minimizing any potential liability or unnecessary repercussions.
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A government that hosts land-based investments may need to confront
immediate complaints that require specific action, or may anticipate
the need to address grievances in the future. Part III of this report
first explores the specific actions that a host government can take
when distinct grievances are triggered by a particular investment or
investor, before turning to general options for governments seeking to
improve their overarching approach to addressing land grievances or to
minimize their liability under international investment treaties. Each
of the options explored below has its own set of advantages, risks, and
accompanying considerations. While these options do not comprise an
exhaustive list, they cover an array of steps that a government could
take in the context of actual or potential land grievances.

SPECIFIC
OPTIONS
When actual grievances are triggered by land-based investments,
host governments will need to take specific steps to address those
grievances. Although various options exist, many of them may raise
potential problems, by creating liability under investment law or
inflaming already existing tensions among local community members.
Governments considering their options should therefore be aware of
the risks related to each action, and should take care in designing their
approach. Awareness of the benefits, drawbacks, and risks can support
governments in making informed and appropriate decisions.
REQUESTING
INVESTOR ACTION
A government can ask an investor to modify its actual or planned
operations to help address related grievances. When the investor
is exercising rights given to it under a contract, license, or other
authorization, such a request would be for voluntary action. While
this may create some risks for the government, there are pragmatic
reasons why an investor might comply.
A government seeking to redress land grievances may consider asking
an investor to change its actual or planned operations. This could
include, for example, a request that the investor gain the free, prior,
and informed consent of land users before expanding its operations
into new parts of the concession area. When the investment and its
operations do not run contrary to domestic laws or the relevant investor-state contract, this would be a request that the investor comply
voluntarily. There are pragmatic and political reasons why an investor
might be inclined to consider such requests.
WHAT TYPE OF REQUESTS
MIGHT A GOVERNMENT MAKE?

At times, an investor may be acting legally and within the scope of its
contract or other applicable authorization, even when its operations
lead to legitimate grievances or have negative human rights impacts.
While the government may find it politically difficult to compel changes
in this situation, it could request that the investor voluntarily change
or modify its operations. For example, a government could consider
asking an investor to not commence new operations on land within
the concession area until receiving permission from or reaching an
agreement with any affected persons. This is a tricky position when the

government has already contracted with the investor to allow use of the
land.57 Such a strategy thus has risks, yet there are also reasons why an
investor might be likely to agree, as discussed below.
WHY MIGHT AN INVESTOR
WANT TO COMPLY?

Even when an investor is operating within the scope of a relevant investor-state contract, and thus not contractually obligated to change its
practices or to take steps to address grievances, there may be practical
reasons for doing so. In some contexts, a “social license to operate”
may be as important as the legal contract for ensuring a favorable
operating environment. Conflicts over land tenure, meanwhile, significantly increase financial risks for investors, with estimates ranging
from operating costs increased by “as much as 29 times … to outright
abandonment of an up-and-running operation.”58 Seeking to gain or
maintain a social license to operate, and particularly to address land
tenure conflicts, may be the most prudent financial step a company can
take when grievances start to arise.
In addition, an investor may have other relevant commitments,
such as through certification bodies or its own company policies, that
would encourage it to comply with government requests to assist in
addressing land grievances. For example, a palm oil company that is
certified by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) must
meet the standards set out in the RSPO Principles and Criteria, which
include that the company’s land use “does not diminish the legal,
customary or user rights of other users without their free, prior and
informed consent.”59 The RSPO provides indicators to assess whether
this was upheld, as well as guidance on the steps companies must
take in respect of FPIC. Indeed, the body has ordered companies to
suspend land-clearing work until complaints related to FPIC have been
resolved.60 The voluntary commitments of buyers may also be relevant
considerations for an investor; for example, Bonsucro, the sustainable sugarcane organization, has suspended an agribusiness company
purchasing sugar produced on concessions with contested land.61 These
external commitments may align with requests made by the government to take actions that would address grievances.
BOX 11: LIBERIA: PREDICATING EXPANSION WITHIN
CONCESSION LAND ON COMMUNITY APPROVAL?
In Liberia, a country with a number of large-scale agricultural
and forestry concessions covering a significant swath of the
country’s land, grievances have arisen as investors seek to expand
operations within concession areas onto land claimed by communities. These grievances have led to conflict, violence, advocacy
campaigns against the investors, a request from an outside
certification body to halt further expansion while complaints were
investigated, and, in one case, a commitment by the President
that no further expansion of operations would occur without the
affected community’s approval.62
This commitment was unexpected, provided during a meeting
with communities concerned about the investor’s efforts to
expand palm oil production onto their customary lands. The
relevant concession agreements, however, which arguably covered
the land in question, provided no recognition of customary ownership rights, excepting tribal reserves of land.63 While the story is
still playing out, this is a particularly interesting example of how a
government has sought to balance community rights in respect of
planned expansion within a concession area.
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Further, an investor’s own policies might require respect for
human rights, and an investor seeking to comply with the UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights may have already
undertaken human rights due diligence or other steps to ensure
that its operations are rights-compliant. A government’s request to
modify operations to better comply with human rights would thus
be compatible with the investor’s internal policies, and a refusal to
do so may pose reputational or other risks.
HOW WOULD REQUESTING
INVESTOR ACTION HELP?

Requesting investor action may be a pragmatic way to find
solutions for grievances. For example, an investor may be better
placed to address grievances stemming from concerns that it had
not delivered promised benefits, which the community may have
expected even if the investor was not contractually obligated to
provide them.
If an investor agrees to take certain requested actions, this could
help redress grievances while avoiding a need to renegotiate or end
the investment. Voluntary investor action in this manner may help
make the investment more sustainable in the long run.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS RELATED TO
REQUESTING INVESTOR ACTION?

A request by the government for the investor to take, or refrain
from taking, certain actions is likely permissible under international
law. Some investment arbitration tribunals, however, have found
governments liable for efforts to force or pressure investors into
giving up their contractual rights.
Depending on the request, or how frequently a government makes
such requests, this strategy may pose reputational risks for the
country. While a government should not be faulted for taking steps
to protect the rights of its citizens, repeated requests that are taken
as demands contravening a relevant investment agreement could
make potential investors wary.
Yet another risk of this strategy arises from its dependence on the
voluntary actions of the investor. This strategy might not be appropriate when the government needs to ensure that the investor takes
or refrains from taking certain actions, such as when the grievances
relate to human rights abuses. It also might not be appropriate
when grievances require more comprehensive solutions involving
more than one investor. In these cases, other options might be more
suitable, such as renegotiating a contract or adopting changes in the
law (both discussed below).
WHEN IS THIS
OPTION APPROPRIATE?

Requesting investor action may be appropriate when grievances are
the result of operations that are not technically violations of the
law or the investor-state contract. (To the extent that operations
violate law or contractual obligations, the government has much
greater scope to force the investor to take remedial actions.) This
option is also a sensible approach when the grievance could be more
effectively resolved by the investor than by the government.
Legal or reputational risk might be mitigated when the investor
agrees that the requested action would make good business sense
or aligns with standards to which it has already committed, whether
voluntary or binding in nature.
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SHAPING OR RESHAPING
CONCESSION BOUNDARIES
In limited contexts, a government may be bound by an investment
contract that does not explicitly delineate the specific boundaries
of the land the investor will use. In this case, the government may
be able to shape concession boundaries in a way that minimizes
negative impacts on local communities and thus reduces grievances.
Additionally, even when the concession boundaries have already
been established, a government may seek to reshape the boundaries to help address grievances over land allocation.
A government that has already entered into an investor-state contract
may be in a position to shape—or may seek to “reshape”—the specific
boundaries of the concession to address grievances tied to the
allocation of land to an investor. Shaping the boundaries could occur
when the government and investor have entered into an agreement
for land use without well-defined boundaries for the area to be used.
The window of opportunity for this approach is generally limited, with
some space for maneuvering after a contract has been concluded but
before the concession boundaries have been delineated. Reshaping the
boundaries, on the other hand, could occur at any point during the term
of the contract.
WHAT IS MEANT BY “SHAPING”
CONCESSION BOUNDARIES?

Investor-state contracts for land-based investments often set out
the area allocated to the investor for use. Some contracts provide
extremely specific information on the area boundaries, such as a long
list of geographic coordinates or a detailed explanation of the physical
boundaries. Other contracts provide more general information on
the area boundaries, noting, for example, that the investor is to lease
a certain number of hectares in specified areas or sub-divisions (for
example, sectors or districts). In this case, the contracting parties may
have agreed to a map or site plan of the concession area that provides
more concrete details, which is generally provided in an annex to the
contract and considered to be part of the agreement.
In some situations, however, an investor-state contract may have
been concluded without explicit agreement on the final area to be used
by the investor for operations under the agreement. This may have been
a deliberate effort to help avoid the use of land that is already claimed,
or it may have been incorporated in a contract for other reasons. In
such cases, the contract may simply provide approximate amounts
of hectares and general locations. When this occurs, national law or
policies may provide a more explicit process to define the boundaries of
land that can be used,64 or the contract itself may describe the process
that will be followed.65 Such a process opens up the possibility for the
government to try to minimize negative impacts, when, for example,
new information appears after the contract’s conclusion, but before
the final delineation of boundaries, that illustrates the potential for
grievances to arise.
WHAT IS MEANT BY “RESHAPING”
CONCESSION BOUNDARIES?

Even after the boundaries of a concession have been delineated,
there may still be some scope for the government and the investor
to “reshape” those boundaries. In practice, many large concessions
provide much more land than is necessary for operations, and an

investor may not intend to use all of its allocated land.66 Indeed, in
the course of operations, some investors identify parcels of land that
they do not intend to use, even though they may be entitled through
their contract to operate on it.67 Particularly if an investor has already
planned to not use some land within the concession area, this may open
up an opportunity for the government to ask the investor to reshape
the concession boundaries by explicitly carving out certain parts of the
concession area.68
Reshaping specific concession boundaries could be predicated on the
provision of alternative land, or instead with the understanding that
it would narrow the total amount of land available. When reshaping
would require carving out or swapping a substantial amount of land,
a government and investor may decide that a full renegotiation of
the investor-state contract is necessary. In other cases, this could be
documented through a side letter, or through a simple amendment to
the contract or to the contract’s relevant exhibit defining the concession area.69
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF SHAPING OR RESHAPING
CONCESSION BOUNDARIES?

When a government has the opportunity to shape concession boundaries as described above, this strategy may help to delineate areas in
a way that avoids or mitigates negative impacts. Doing so presents an
opportunity for a government to address actual or potential grievances
about which it may not have been aware or concerned at the time of
the contract negotiations, or that have arisen, for example, during the
survey process. Careful upfront work in shaping boundaries can also
help the government avoid the need to seek a negotiation of a contract
amendment, or even a renegotiation of the contract. This helps protect
the government’s interests, as such an amendment may require
the government to give up other points in return, while pressure to
renegotiate concession boundaries after an investor-state contract has
been entered into may create risks related to government obligations
under an investment treaty. In addition, efforts to shape boundaries
with an eye to minimizing grievances may also appeal to the investor, as
a careful delineation could help prevent future community conflicts and
avoidable risks.
Even after the concession area has been selected, a government
and investor may find it prudent to reshape the boundaries.70 If use
of certain parts of the concession area is strongly contested, carving
such parts out (with or without additional land to replace it) may help
reduce investor-community conflict and ensure the sustainability of
the investment’s general operations. Particularly if the land tied to
the grievances is unlikely to be used by the investor, relinquishing it
can help address both operational and reputational risks with minimal
impact on the investor. Investors may also be interested in this
approach to the extent that ceding land reduces rental fees (where
fees are paid on the entire concession area), or helps ensure compliance with development commitments (when the contract obliges the
investor to develop a certain percentage of the land by a certain date).
Undertaking efforts to shape or reshape concession boundaries also
creates the opportunity to seek and obtain the free, prior, and informed
consent (FPIC) of potentially affected individuals or communities.
Doing so may be required of the government or investor in some
cases. Even when not required, a proper FPIC process constitutes best
practice and helps to reduce avoidable risks. Among other benefits,
obtaining FPIC, and undertaking community consultation more
generally, provides useful insight for the government and investor on

how best to shape or reshape boundaries to minimize future problems
while also diminishing existing tensions by demonstrating respect for
peoples’ land and their claims to that land.
WHAT POTENTIAL RISKS
ARISE FROM THIS STRATEGY?

One risk related to shaping boundaries may simply be that the narrow
situations in which this option applies reduce the likelihood that a
government would be aware of potential grievances in time to take
appropriate steps. Another risk is that the government may not have
sufficient scope within the established process to shape the boundaries
in a way that fully respects the rights of individuals or communities that
stand to be affected. For example, the scale of the land promised might
be so vast that the government is unable to find a sufficient amount
that is truly unencumbered and does not require displacement of communities. The investor-state contract may or may not contemplate an
alternative if not enough suitable land is available within the identified
concession area. A government seeking to shape boundaries in a way
that minimizes grievances thus may still end up agreeing to concession
or production areas that require displacement and raise corresponding
risks of violating human rights obligations.
Efforts to reshape boundaries may carry greater risks than shaping
them in the first place, particularly when the land in question is of such
a significant scope that a formal agreement or renegotiation of the
contract might be required. Risks related to renegotiation are discussed
below, while risks arising from asking an investor to undertake voluntary action are discussed above. In addition, if the government seeks
to use this option repeatedly, or at a large scale, this strategy could
create reputational risks for the government, affecting future investors’
perceptions of the operating environment. Yet another risk is that the
land that aggrieved individuals or communities recover through the
reshaping of boundaries might be inadequate, or less optimal than the
land remaining within the concession.
WHEN SHOULD A GOVERNMENT TRY TO SHAPE
OR RESHAPE CONCESSION BOUNDARIES?

As noted above, the option to shape boundaries after an agreement
has been signed will not always be available. This approach could be
taken, however, when the investor-state contract does not provide
explicit boundaries of the land to be leased or used, the government
and investor have not yet agreed to the specific boundaries, and the
relevant process established by domestic law or by contract provides
an opportunity for the government to shape boundaries as needed.
Because of these restrictions, a government may not realize that such
a strategy would be useful until it is too late to implement. However,
because the process of surveying the land can itself create tensions with
existing land users, it is conceivable that situations may arise in which
this strategy would be viable and useful.
A strategy to reshape boundaries does not have the same time
constraints, and could be undertaken at any point during the contract
term. Because this was likely not a process contemplated at the time
the contract was negotiated, however, there may be more legal and
political risks tied to this strategy. This strategy thus might be more
feasible when it is also in the interest of the investor, for the reasons
outlined above, or when the investor is not tied to the land in question
and is amenable to receiving replacement land.
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FACILITATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES
FOR AFFECTED INDIVIDUALS OR COMMUNITIES
A government can facilitate efforts to resolve disputes or grievances
in many ways, including through establishing, supporting, or
facilitating access to dispute resolution processes for affected
individuals or communities. Such processes include non-judicial
public institutions, government-supported mediation and facilitation, project-level grievance mechanisms established by the
investor, and external grievance mechanisms. Dispute resolution
processes should be designed carefully: while they have the potential
to minimize conflict and foster solutions, they can also compound
conflicts and grievances when not designed and implemented
according to best practices.
Ensuring access to appropriate dispute resolution processes can help
resolve community grievances regarding land-based investments.
Dispute resolution processes include courts and tribunals, as well as
“non-judicial” processes and institutions. The latter are not meant to
replace domestic courts, but a government may find that, in some cases,
an additional forum is useful to address community concerns, such as
when domestic court systems are overburdened or inaccessible.
WHAT ARE NON-JUDICIAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROCESSES?

Non-judicial “dispute resolution processes” are procedures used to help
resolve a grievance, dispute, or claim. While these come in many forms,
four types are particularly relevant for land grievances:
öö Non-judicial institutions that are financed by the state and have
some scope to receive or investigate complaints, such as Cambodia’s
Cadastral Commission or the Kenya National Commission
on Human Rights;
öö Government-supported mediation and facilitation between
communities and companies;
öö Project-level grievance mechanisms, which are generally established
by the investor, either voluntarily or in compliance with government
requirements; and
öö External grievance mechanisms, such as those provided by
multi-stakeholder initiatives or certification schemes (such as the
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil), or by development finance
institutions (such as the International Finance Corporation’s
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman).
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF A DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS,
AND WHAT ELEMENTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED?

A neutral and easily accessible dispute resolution process can offer
an effective way to resolve grievances in a timely manner, as well as
to remedy past wrongs. Resolving grievances quickly and effectively
can also help limit or mitigate consequences that might otherwise
arise from grievances, such as public outrage, protest, or even violent
conflict. In turn, this may reduce operational, financial, and reputational risks for the government and the investor.
As part of their obligations to protect human rights, governments
are bound to take steps to provide access to effective remedy for
business-related human rights abuses.71 This includes state-based
judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, which can be complemented
by project-level grievance mechanisms and other dispute resolu-
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tion processes. To ensure compatibility with human rights, dispute
resolution processes should comply with the effectiveness criteria for
non-judicial grievance mechanisms set out in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. This means that processes should
be legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable, and transparent. They
also should be rights-compatible, meaning that outcomes and remedies
are aligned with human rights norms, and should evolve and improve
over time. In addition, operational-level or project-based mechanisms
operated by or in partnership with the investor should be based on
engagement with the stakeholders that will use them.72
Each of these criteria highlight a range of issues to consider in
the design or implementation of any dispute resolution process. For
example, to ensure accessibility, careful attention should be paid
regarding language, cost, physical location, and ease of use, including
for people who are illiterate. Considerations regarding gender must also
be factored into the design, as women and girls often face additional
barriers in accessing dispute resolution processes.73
Remedies awarded through such processes must also be appropriately tailored and proportionate to the specific concern. As with
compensation, discussed below, remedies should be determined in
consultation with affected persons.74
BOX 12: INSUFFICIENT REMEDIES:
EXAMPLE FROM THE MINING INDUSTRY
An example of compensation for human rights abuses that was
challenged as not being appropriately tailored and proportionate is
the compensation paid by Barrick Gold Corporation to women who
had been raped by security guards contracted by the company. The
women were initially offered assistance with setting up small-scale
development projects, such as being given secondhand clothes to
sell or livestock. Such remedies were perceived as incommensurate
with, and not designed to remedy, the harm they had suffered. The
company later announced plans to adjust the remedy to a scheme
that was more reliant on cash payments. This was also seen as
ineffective, owing in part to the fact that all women receiving
compensation were to receive a uniform amount, regardless of the
gravity of the violation they had suffered.75

SHOULD A GOVERNMENT CONSIDER ESTABLISHING
AN INDEPENDENT MECHANISM?

A government can establish independent mechanisms to address land
grievances. Alternatively, it can empower existing public institutions
to assist with the investigation of complaints and the determination of
an appropriate remedy. Government mechanisms may focus primarily
on land claims, or on a broader range of issues, such as human rights.
In some contexts, mechanisms established by the government may be
perceived as more legitimate than investor-established mechanisms.
This may not be the case, however, when government representatives
also act as investors, or when the government has demonstrated its
intention to allow a problematic investment to continue. In such
circumstances, concerns about legitimacy can sometimes be alleviated
by ensuring that the dispute resolution process operates independently,
and that, when appropriate, it possesses the power to require (rather
than merely recommend) that investors or the government provide a
remedy. In addition to establishing or empowering appropriate mechanisms, processes, or institutions, it is equally important to facilitate
their use by aggrieved individuals or communities.

BOX 13: CAMBODIA’S
CADASTRAL COMMISSION
Cambodia’s Cadastral Commission is a public institution that was
created to resolve disputes regarding land ownership in a quicker,
less expensive, and less adversarial manner than resorting to a
court.76 The Commission has a three-tiered hierarchy (district,
provincial, and national levels), and is empowered to hear disputes
about land ownership of untitled land.77 The district level seeks
to assist parties to arrive at an agreement through facilitation and
mediation. If agreement cannot be reached, parties can take the
matter to the provincial Cadastral Commission, which has the
power to “decide” a dispute.78 Its decision can be appealed to the
National Cadastral Commission, whose decision is then appealable
to Cambodia’s court system.79
One significant shortcoming is the limited scope of issues that
the Commission can consider, which precludes claimants from
pursuing related claims falling outside its mandate.80 For instance,
community members that brought a claim to Cambodia’s Koh
Kong Provincial Court regarding, amongst other complaints,
infringements on property rights allegedly caused by investments
in sugar plantations were referred to the Cadastral Commission
because the claim involved a dispute over unregistered land. In
the Cadastral Commission process, however, the claimants were
unable to pursue an additional claim challenging the legality of
the sugar plantations, because the Commission did not have the
jurisdiction to determine such a claim.81

investment. When requested, providing the community with access
to legal representation or assistance during the mediation can help to
minimize power imbalances between the parties and to build meaningful consensus.90
SHOULD A GOVERNMENT REQUIRE OR ENCOURAGE
PROJECT-LEVEL GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS,
OR FACILITATE THE USE OF EXTERNAL MECHANISMS?

Governments should encourage investors to develop their own
project-level grievance mechanisms to complement existing statebased dispute resolution processes.91 In some circumstances,
governments might consider requiring investors to establish them.
Such mechanisms, which may use conciliation, negotiation, or more
adjudicatory processes, often can resolve disputes in a more efficient
manner than court processes while also removing from the government the operational burden of hearing complaints. They should not,
however, preclude individuals from accessing domestic courts or other
forums for seeking redress.92 One way of ensuring that a project-level
mechanism operates legitimately is to incorporate the oversight of an
independent supervisor, or a representative stakeholder group.93 Where
needed, an independent, neutral expert can be added to the stakeholder
group to help facilitate the group’s oversight role.94
In addition to project-level mechanisms, other external accountability processes through which individuals can pursue complaints

BOX 14: THE KENYA NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS

BOX 15: THE IFC’S COMPLIANCE
ADVISOR/OMBUDSMAN

The Kenya National Commission on Human Rights is an
independent institution that can hear complaints regarding a broad
range of human rights,82 including complaints about land-related
issues.83 The Commission attempts to resolve complaints using
conciliation, mediation, and negotiation, but ultimately has the
power of a court to order the payment of compensation84 or “any
other lawful remedy or redress.”85 The Commission has experience
managing a large number of complaints in a rights-compliant way.86
In practice, the Commission’s summonses and its orders for
redress are not always implemented, and have been ignored by
government officials.87 However, this problem also plagues the
country’s courts.88

The IFC’s Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) is a grievance
mechanism accessible to persons aggrieved by a project financed
by the IFC. In a recent case, CAO-led mediations resulted in
a Vietnamese rubber corporation reaching an agreement with
14 project-affected communities in Cambodia.95 The investor
committed to not clearing or developing additional land or otherwise expanding its operations associated with certain concessions.
This commitment was accompanied by a range of other measures
aimed at redressing past adverse impacts and minimizing the
negative impacts of existing operations, including commitments
to only use chemical products that comply with environmental
regulations, to repair infrastructure damaged by the investor, and
to adopt an operational grievance mechanism for the investor’s
agribusiness operations within Cambodia. The agreement came
19 months after the lodging of the communities’ initial written
complaint.96

SHOULD A GOVERNMENT HELP FACILITATE MEDIATION
BETWEEN THE INVESTOR AND THE COMMUNITY?

Mediation is a dispute resolution process that is facilitated by a
neutral third party; it is generally non-binding. Not all situations are
suitable for mediation. When grievances relate to criminal offenses, for
example, those offenses should be prosecuted rather than mediated.
In addition, when relevant stakeholders are not committed to reaching
an agreed outcome, mediation will not work.89 When stakeholders do
wish to address their conflict through mediation, however, a government potentially can assist, including through helping to install an
independent facilitator with expertise in dispute resolution. Mediators
and facilitators must refrain from exerting any undue influence over
community members, and their selection should be agreed upon by
both the community and the investor. In addition, negotiations related
to how the mediation will proceed should take place in the context
of both sides having access to all relevant information regarding the

also exist. A government confronting land grievances can thus explore
whether these additional processes are available to aggrieved individuals, and, if so, can provide information or other support to facilitate
their use. These mechanisms include those provided by multi-stakeholder initiatives and certification schemes, like the Roundtable on
Sustainable Palm Oil and the Forest Stewardship Council, as well as
complaints processes offered by development finance institutions, such
as the International Finance Corporation (IFC). When the investor is
a member of, certified by, or has received funding from such entities,
these external mechanisms will generally be an option for individuals or
communities harmed by an investment.
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WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF ESTABLISHING, REQUIRING,
OR FACILITATING ACCESS TO A DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS?

In developing or requiring non-judicial dispute resolution processes,
a government risks doing so in a manner that fails to comply with its
international legal obligations, and should thus take care in designing
such processes. For example, a government-implemented grievance
mechanism should meet the criteria articulated in the UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights, described above, and in
particular should not supplant or preclude access to judicial or other
non-judicial mechanisms.
While efforts to establish, require, or facilitate access to a dispute
resolution process are not likely to implicate an investment treaty
obligation, some situations might raise risks. For example, if requiring
an investor to establish a grievance mechanism is contrary to an already
existing commitment given by the government, this requirement could
be considered problematic. Or, if a public institution were to impose a
solution to address land grievances that was contrary to the investor’s
protected interests, a government might confront tensions in seeking
to implement that solution while also meeting its obligations under an
applicable investment treaty. Additionally, to the extent that a government’s efforts to facilitate access to existing grievance mechanisms
are seen as encouraging opposition to the project or frustrating the
investment’s operations, an investor might also argue that the government’s actions violated its obligations under the fair and equitable
treatment standard, full protection and security obligation, or other
treaty commitment.97
There are also risks that the dispute resolution process will not
effectively resolve grievances, or will not be used by aggrieved persons.
For example, a mechanism that excludes legitimate complainants or is
hard to access may be ineffective. Those aggrieved may decide not to
pursue a remedy through a dispute resolution process if the remedies
offered are inadequate, or if engaging with the process precludes
pursuit of claims in other legal forums.98 Affected individuals also may
be unwilling to engage with dispute resolution processes for fear of
government- or company-backed reprisals.99 Project-level grievance
mechanisms, in particular, run the risk that the relevant investor may
become unable or unwilling to maintain the requisite level of resources
and engagement for the mechanism to operate effectively.
RESTITUTING PROPERTY TO DISPLACED
INDIVIDUALS OR COMMUNITIES
When grievances relate to the loss of land or property, restitution
to those who lost their land may be one of the most effective
remedies that a government can employ. However, restitution of
land already allocated to an investor may not always be possible,
may not be deemed appropriate, or may raise risks related to a government’s investment law obligations. A government that decides to
pursue restitution by taking land from an investor and returning it
to displaced individuals should follow requirements set by domestic
and international law regarding expropriation of property.
Restitution can be an appropriate remedy in some cases for individuals
or communities that have lost their land or material possessions due
to a land-based investment. When applicable, restitution should also
always be considered once an investment has concluded, including
when it has failed (see Box 16). Restitution may not be possible,
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however, where the land has been rendered uninhabitable or
unproductive, and may be difficult for a government in the context of
ongoing investments, where investors have ownership or leasehold
rights over the land in question. Such challenges are not insurmountable, but pose some risks.
WHAT IS
RESTITUTION?

Restitution refers to “reestablish[ing] the situation which existed
before the wrongful act was committed.”100 While restitution can
include a range of actions, this discussion focuses on restitution as
the return of land or property. When development-based evictions
or displacement have occurred, including due to land-based investments, a government should, when possible, “establish conditions
and provide the means, including financial, for voluntary return in
safety and security, and with dignity, to homes or places of habitual
residence.”101 Such a return should only occur when in line with the
wishes of the resettled individuals or communities,102 and according to
procedures that are equitable, timely, independent, transparent, and
non-discriminatory.103
WHEN IS
RESTITUTION APPROPRIATE?

Grievances flowing from land-based investments are often related to
displacement from land. In some cases, the negative impacts of such
displacement may be so severe, and the grievances so strong, that
restitution of land may appear to be the most appropriate option.
Moreover, in certain situations, restitution may be necessary for the
government to comply with its human rights obligations. Indeed, restitution is the most appropriate remedy for property- or land-related
violations of human rights, to which other remedies like compensation are secondary alternatives.104 Accordingly, when rights violations
are involved, a government should assess whether restitution is
possible before considering alternatives like compensation. Restitution is particularly important when indigenous peoples’ land has been
taken without their free, prior, and informed consent.105
Restitution is not always possible, however. In practice, the
circumstances of forced evictions and resettlement “seldom allow for
BOX 16: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER
AN INVESTMENT HAS CONCLUDED?
What happens after an investment has concluded can sometimes
be as consequential as what happens during its operation. Although
many land-based investments fail,106 and still others are designed
for a limited duration, governments and investors do not always
have comprehensive plans for sustainable project closure. This
creates the possibility that land grievances can endure even after
the investor has left. When these grievances relate to displacement
from land, and when that land remains habitable or productive,
restitution of the land to those displaced is an appropriate option,
and should be considered before assessing whether the land can be
offered to other investors.107 Where there are multiple claims to the
land, or when the contested evictions are not recent, a government
should strive to ensure that efforts to restitute such land benefit
those with legitimate tenure claims.

TO WHOM SHOULD RESTITUTED
PROPERTY BE MADE AVAILABLE?

restitution and return.”108 For instance, it may be materially impossible to order restitution in respect of property that has been altered
or damaged to the point that its return would not fulfill the right being
asserted.109 In this case, restitution will not be able to entirely remedy
the wrong, and compensation should be used as an additional or alternative remedy.110
In addition, restitution may not be deemed appropriate when the
land was expropriated for the public’s benefit or for a public purpose.
As discussed in Box 17, it is unclear whether the taking of land to facilitate a private investment can constitute a public purpose, especially
where the potential public benefits of such an investment, such as job
creation or increased national fiscal revenues, are difficult to realize.

BOX 17: DOES THE TAKING OF LAND
FOR A PRIVATE INVESTMENT
CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC PURPOSE?
Whether the taking of land to facilitate the purposes of private
investment constitutes a public purpose is debatable. The Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land,
Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security
exhort states to “clearly define the concept of public purpose in
law, in order to allow for judicial review” while also ensuring that
“all actions are consistent with their national law as well as their
existing obligations under national and international law, and with
due regard to voluntary commitments under applicable regional
and international instruments.”111
Projects requiring land for the construction of public amenities
and services may well fall within the public interest, as may large
infrastructure projects requiring land.112 It may be more difficult to
invoke the public interest where land is taken to enable an investor
to carry out an agricultural or forestry concession. The benefits
of agricultural or forestry investments are said to lie primarily in
their potential for employment creation, leveraged infrastructure,
and increased public revenue;113 however, such potential is often
difficult to realize, which may reduce the chances an investment
will constitute a public purpose.
Courts in different jurisdictions have expressed divergent
opinions on whether the taking of land for a private investment
can constitute a public purpose. The Supreme Court of Canada
noted in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia that a logging
concession could be considered to be a public interest objective
that could override Aboriginal title, while also noting that logging
is a “serious infringement [of Aboriginal title] that will not lightly
be justified.”114 In that case, the Court ultimately held that logging
in the area in question was not in the public interest, as it was not
economically viable, and had an impact on the plaintiff’s Aboriginal
title that was disproportionate to the economic benefits that would
accrue to the State, or Canadian society generally.115
However, in the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay
case, discussed above in Box 9, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights rejected an argument that the allocation of indigenous land for the purposes of investment constituted a public
purpose.116 It held that such an argument approached indigenous
claims to land title “from the standpoint of land productivity and
agrarian law,” which was “insufficient” because it failed to address
“the distinctive characteristics of such peoples.”117

Restitution should be awarded to the individuals or communities who
held some form of title or legitimate tenure claims to the property
before it was taken away. Restitution should be undertaken with
the participation of affected individuals, groups, or communities in
the planning and management of return processes.118 This includes
special measures to ensure the meaningful participation of women to
overcome existing gender biases and marginalization, if needed.119 An
inclusive process helps assure that restoring individuals to the situation
they were in before they were deprived of property does not reinforce
pre-existing inequalities.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS
OF RESTITUTION AS A REMEDY?

Restitution of land used by an investor may raise risks related to a
government’s international investment law obligations. An investor,
for example, might argue that the government’s decision to grant
restitution:
öö Constitutes an expropriation of the investment;
öö Breaches the investor’s right to fair and equitable treatment by
violating a legitimate expectation that it would have unrestricted
and continuing access to the land; or
öö Impacts more on that investor than on other businesses
and therefore constitutes discrimination.
A government seeking to take land from an investor and return it to
displaced individuals or communities should first determine whether
the investor in fact has valid rights to the land. If so, the government
should follow requirements set by domestic and international law
regarding expropriation of property.

BOX 18: GROUP CLAIMS
REGARDING RESTITUTION OF LAND
When it comes to claims by indigenous groups or tribal communities requesting restitution of land, the tests used to determine
whether restitution is warranted vary by jurisdiction. Often,
a primary issue considered is whether affected claimants can
demonstrate an enduring connection,120 or an “all-encompassing
relationship,”121 with the land claimed. In addition, domestic and
regional laws differ regarding the entitlement of indigenous or
tribal communities to restitution of land when an investor has
subsequently obtained an interest in the land in good faith. For
instance, private ownership of land can act as a complete bar to
restitution in Australia.122 In Canada, however, the Supreme Court
has found that once Aboriginal title has been established, a project
might need to be canceled if its continuation “would be unjustifiably infringing.”123 Meanwhile, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights has determined that the transfer of ownership of land into
the hands of an investor does not pose a bar to restitution,124 noting
that otherwise restitution rights would become “meaningless.”125
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COMPENSATING AFFECTED
INDIVIDUALS OR COMMUNITIES
Providing compensation (land, goods, services, and/or money) is
one way in which a government, as well as investors, may seek to
alleviate land grievances. While compensation is often a significant
remedial mechanism, it should not be used to excuse flagrant violations of land rights or human rights. Further, when the grievances
are severe, compensation alone may not stop the risk of community
conflict and protest. When provided, compensation should be
determined in consultation with affected individuals or community
representatives, and should comprise primarily “in kind” compensation—land, goods, and improved public services—with supplemental
cash payments where appropriate. Compensation should seek to
restore project-affected individuals or communities to a position
that is as favorable as, or more favorable than, their position before
the harm causing the grievance occurred.

Compensation, in this context, means the payment of money and/or the
allocation of land or other goods and services as a means of acknowledging and remedying a harm. Such harms can include, for example,
displacing individuals or communities from the land on which they rely
or otherwise causing them to suffer financial loss.

for unwarranted detentions of individuals protesting an investment.
When compensation is provided to address violations of human rights,
its provision will not necessarily absolve a government of its legal
obligations, but may form an important part of the remedy for
such violations.
Compensation is most commonly considered as a strategy for
addressing displacement (both voluntary and involuntary) from
land, as well as related grievances. When involuntary displacement
has occurred, including forced evictions, a government should first
consider whether restitution of land, discussed above, is a viable option.
Even when restitution occurs, compensation may also be necessary
to address other losses suffered by those forcibly resettled. If the
land cannot be returned to those who have been resettled, however,
including when the land is no longer suitable for previous livelihood
uses, compensation is an appropriate remedy for a government
to consider.
When grievances concern an investment’s future effects, and those
concerned remain living on their land, compensation should not be
viewed as a means of “buying” or “paying a penalty for” future human
rights violations, such as those linked to forced evictions. However,
providing adequate compensation can be an appropriate remedy when
the taking of land is deemed to be in the public interest,127 or for a
public purpose.128 The European Court of Human Rights, for example,
has deferred to governments to determine when takings are needed
to fulfill the public interest,129 and has noted that whether the taking
strikes a fair balance between competing interests depends in part on
the terms of the compensation offered to those whose land is expropriated.130 Box 17, above, discusses whether taking land for the purposes
of private investment can constitute a public purpose. In such cases,
compensation provided as part of a resettlement action plan may be a
precondition for the legality of the expropriation.

WHAT ARE THE LIMITATIONS OF
COMPENSATION AS A REMEDY?

WHO SHOULD
BE COMPENSATED?

Compensation, whether monetary or in kind, is unlikely to provide a
comprehensive remedy for certain grievances, such as those arising
from forced evictions and accompanying human rights violations.
One ex-World Bank staffer, for instance, underlined the importance
of compensation in this context while lamenting that the limits of
compensation as a remedy “reinforce the main poverty risks inherent in
forced displacements.”126 Compensation will almost always fall short for
resettled communities because of the many economic, social, cultural,
and other networks that are broken when a community is forced off its
land. The destruction of these networks, which are often unquantifiable, can impoverish those resettled in ways that extend beyond simply
losing a real property asset. For this reason, a government seeking to
redress grievances stemming from forced evictions and resettlement
should first assess whether restitution of the taken land is possible.

A government seeking to compensate for displacement from land
must determine who is entitled to compensation. This is a critical
and complex question in rural areas of low-income countries, where
different types of land rights can be held by individuals or collectively by households, groups, or communities, and where such rights
often overlap.131 International standards, such as those developed by
international and regional development banks,132 underline that absence
of formal legal title should not bar affected persons from receiving
compensation for expropriation of their property. A government thus
needs to compensate all individuals or communities with legitimate
rights to the land in question, regardless of whether they have formal
legal documentation.
In some places, women risk not benefiting from compensation
received by their household for the expropriation of their land.133 This
is especially true in societies where women are unlikely to hold legal
title, as compensation is often paid only to individuals who hold legal
title to the land or who are deemed the “head” of the household.134 For
instance, amongst households resettled in Vietnam to make way for
hydropower projects, some women only learned that compensation
had been paid to the household after it had already been spent.135 To
address these challenges, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the

Compensating individuals or communities that have been or will
be negatively affected by a land-based investment is another option
available to a government seeking to address land grievances. While
compensation is often an insufficient remedy for certain grievances,
at times it may be the most appropriate option available. When
compensation is provided, a government should carefully assess
who should receive compensation, as well as the type and quantum
of compensation.
WHAT IS
“COMPENSATION”?

WHEN IS
COMPENSATION APPROPRIATE?

A government may determine that compensation should be incorporated in its efforts to address a range of grievances tied to land-based
investments. For example, compensation might be offered to amend
for negative environmental impacts causing harm to communities, or
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United Nations recommends that a government paying compensation identify which household members hold de facto interests in the
land, and ensure that compensation is paid using a mechanism that
facilitates joint decision-making within households regarding the use
of such funds.136
Individuals who lose access to common land or public lands
on which they had relied for resources or livelihood activities are
particularly vulnerable, as they are often overlooked in compensation
schemes.137 Such “landless” individuals must also receive compensation
for their economic displacement from the land.138
SHOULD COMPENSATION
BE IN KIND OR FINANCIAL?

When displacement from land has occurred, in-kind compensation—in
the form of replacement property, public services, and infrastructure—should be the primary form of compensation allocated.139 This is
preferable to cash compensation, which transfers the risks associated
with acquiring replacement land, housing, and infrastructure onto the
individuals or communities being resettled.140 In many contexts,
cash compensation alone will not suffice in restoring the lost livelihoods of recipients, leading to further impoverishment. Any replacement land should also be titled and registered in the names of both
female and male heads of each household when relevant. Additional
arrangements that can be included in a “compensation package” to
communities include state-funded pensions,141 increased access to
health care,142 and increased spending by the investor on community
development programs.143
HOW TO DETERMINE COMPENSATION:
(I) CONSULTATION

A government should consult with the affected individuals or
community when determining the form and amount of compensation.144 Consultation has many advantages. Incorporating a community’s perspective can help in restoring any economic, social, or other
networks harmed by displacement; it may also help to avoid future
community grievances, conflict, or litigation. Consultation may also
minimize the chances of a court later determining that the type or
amount of compensation was insufficient or unreasonable.
Consultation processes should ensure opportunities for women
and other non-dominant groups within a community to provide input.
Gender-sensitive consultative strategies include researching the times
and locations that suit women’s availability, anonymous voting on
proposals to facilitate participation free of influence, and expressly
requiring women to be included in meetings of community leaders.145
HOW TO DETERMINE COMPENSATION:
(II) CALCULATION OF QUANTUM

Where land cannot be returned, individuals who have lost land should
be compensated with land commensurate in quality, size, and value,
or better.146 Such land should be accompanied by security of tenure,
as well as adequate housing and access to necessary services.147 In
addition, the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based
Evictions and Displacement recommend that, at a minimum, a
government must provide displaced individuals with “safe and secure
access to:

öö
öö
öö
öö
öö
öö

essential food, potable water and sanitation;
basic shelter and housing;
appropriate clothing;
essential medical services;
livelihood sources;
fodder for livestock and access to common property resources
previously depended upon; and
öö education for children and childcare facilities.”148
A government providing cash compensation should ensure the amount
(quantum) is appropriate. Leading practices seek to place the affected
individuals in a position that is as favorable as, or better than, the
position they were in before the land was taken.149 In addition to
incorporating objective valuations of the market value of the land,
improvements, and any lost personal property, this may require
economic analyses of land-derived income, and articulation of the
cultural, economic, and other benefits provided by the land.150 This can
be extremely difficult, and many domestic laws regarding compensation
for resettlement fall short of this standard, compensating only for the
market value of lost assets.151
As noted above, the loss of land is not the only loss from land-based
investments that must be compensated. Compensation must also be
paid for any other economically assessable damage, which, as noted by
the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions
and Displacement, may include “loss of life or limb; physical or mental
harm; lost opportunities, including employment, education and social
benefits; material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of
earning potential; moral damage; and costs required for legal or expert
assistance, medicine and medical services, and psychological and social
services.”152 Calculation of fair compensation for these losses should
include a gender-specific analysis.153
WHO
PAYS?

When compensation is provided to address displacement caused by
land-based investments, the government is generally responsible for
providing it. Under international law, the government is the primary
bearer of human rights obligations, while many domestic laws also
place the responsibility to compensate on the government.154 In
practice, however, governments may shift the burden of compensation
onto investors, for instance, as part of the costs of land leases.155 When
relevant finance-related standards, such as the IFC Performance
Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability or the Equator
Principles, apply to an investment, investors may also have to supplement domestically mandated compensation amounts to ensure that
those international standards are met.156
THE NEED FOR GRIEVANCE MECHANISMS,
MONITORING, AND EVALUATION

Compensation must be monitored and evaluated to track its impact,157
as well as to ensure it is granted in its entirety in a timely manner.158
This can be done by independent state institutions, such as human
rights commissions or land boards. Government decisions regarding
compensation should also be subject to judicial review, ensuring
that decisions are reasonable and accountable.159 For communities
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BOX 19: COMPENSATION RELATED TO SUGAR
CONCESSIONS IN CAMBODIA
In Cambodia, villagers alleging that they were forcibly evicted to
make way for sugar plantations have pursued multiple avenues for
receiving remedies, including compensation. One avenue pursued
by community members was to seek compensation from an Ad
Hoc Inter-Ministerial Committee, convened by the Cambodian
government in 2014 to resolve human rights issues arising from
land concessions that were transferred to sugar plantation companies, including Koh Kong Sugar Industry Co. Ltd. and Phnom Penh
Sugar Co.160 The committee involves Cambodian government
departments and representatives from the European Union, and is
tasked with working with sugar companies to devise a mechanism
for determining and paying affected villagers due compensation.161
Separately, some villagers displaced by sugar plantations brought
a court case in the United Kingdom against Tate & Lyle, which had
purchased sugar grown on the disputed land. The villagers claim
that they own the land, and thus also the crops grown on it, and
argue that they are owed compensation for the purchased sugar.162
They also allege that these events amount to violations of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.163
lacking easy access to judicial institutions, other government- or
investor-operated grievance mechanisms whose procedures are tailored
to community contexts may also be needed.164 Such procedures are
especially important where the entity (the government or the investor)
determining the amount of compensation is also the entity paying
that compensation, as it otherwise may be incentivized to reduce the
amount of compensation payable.165
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS
OF PROVIDING COMPENSATION?

The potential consequences of providing compensation vary depending
on the point at which the grievance arises, as well as the type of
grievance to be compensated. The below discusses relevant considerations when the grievance relates to displacement from land.
Where restitution or return of the land is not possible, compensation can
act as an appropriate, albeit likely insufficient, remedy. One significant
risk, however, is that property or resources lost through displacement
may be undervalued, resulting in inadequate compensation for those
displaced. From a legal perspective, compensation that is adequate and
rights-compliant might limit the government’s liability in domestic
courts, regional human rights courts, and other international human
rights institutions. So long as the government provides the compensation, or the investor has agreed to do so under the investor-state
contract, provision of compensation would also be unlikely to engender
government liability under any operative investment treaty or investor-state contract.
Where a community remains on the land and the grievance concerns
future impacts of an investment, compensation will be less appropriate, unless the community has provided its free, prior, and informed
consent to vacating the land in exchange for agreed compensation.
Without such an agreement, a government seeking to “resettle and
compensate” may violate its legal obligations under international
human rights law. This could result in official findings of legal liability
for violations of international human rights law, which could potentially
be accompanied by orders from a human rights tribunal to restitute
taken lands, as occurred in the Sawhoyamaxa case at the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, discussed in Box 9.
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As a practical matter, a “resettle and compensate” approach can also
inflame community discontent, leading to demonstrations or conflict.
In such circumstances, the risk of property damage and the disruption
of investment projects increases, as does the risk that protestors
might be harmed by security personnel meant to protect the investment. In addition, because compensation is generally incapable of
fully replenishing what a community loses when it is transplanted, a
displaced community is likely to become impoverished.166 Increased
poverty can lead to lower socioeconomic indicators and greater demand
for public services and development programs,167 requiring significant
financial resources to address. Moreover, improper resettlements pose
reputational risks for governments, as resulting conflicts can create the
impression of an unstable business environment.
RENEGOTIATING WITH
THE INVESTOR
Grievances arising from existing land-based investments may,
in certain cases, arise from the legal terms of the investor-state
contract and the scope of the investor’s rights and obligations under
that contract. In such cases, renegotiation of the investor-state
contract to alter those rights or obligations may help address the
grievances. There are, however, a number of challenges that can
arise with respect to renegotiations. For one, investors may be
unwilling to give up rights previously secured or to take on new
obligations under the contract; thus, it may be difficult to bring them
back to the negotiating table and secure additional commitments. In
such cases, the government may be limited in what it can accomplish, particularly if it is concerned about potential liability under
investment treaties. Moreover, the government party to the contract
may not have an interest in addressing the relevant issue(s), or the
authority to do so.
In long-term contracts, requests for renegotiation are not uncommon.
Indeed, they are often requested by investors who are party to investor-state contracts and seek to reduce their obligations or increase
their rights under the agreement. Government requests for renegotiation in order to address land grievances are therefore also possible, and
may be a feasible option to ensure that the contract survives over time.
However, when one party seeks to renegotiate a contract, the other
party may resist, reluctant to give up what it sees as validly secured
legal rights. Thus, a government seeking to renegotiate an investor-state contract for a land-based investment may face difficulties
getting the investor to return to the table. In some cases, the contract
will specify circumstances in which renegotiation is mandatory;
absent such language, renegotiation requests may not be met with the
desired response.
WHEN MIGHT AN INVESTOR
BE WILLING TO RENEGOTIATE?

Certain factors may render an investor more likely to renegotiate.
Efforts to understand the investor’s strategy and culture can be helpful
for assessing whether it might agree to a renegotiation request.168 An
investor with other interests in the country may be more willing to
renegotiate and less likely to seek arbitration, as it has some incentive
to maintain its relationship with the government. Likewise, if an
investor is more interested in the products it would receive through
the investment—for example, rubber needed for the core operations

of a parent company—than in monetary compensation, it may be more
willing to renegotiate.
An investor also might be more amenable to renegotiation if
there has been public pressure around the investment, and credible
documentation of issues related to it. Conversely, an investor with
significant home country support may be less interested in renegotiating, relying instead on such support to pressure the host government to revoke its request. In addition, an investor that has access to
investor-state arbitration under an investment treaty might have less
incentive to renegotiate.
WHAT POTENTIAL RISKS
ARISE FROM THIS OPTION?

If a government seeks to renegotiate the investor-state contract, and
the investor does not wish to cooperate, a government might try to
exercise political pressure and take or threaten sovereign action (such
as a change in the law to accomplish what the renegotiation had aimed
to achieve). Investment arbitration tribunals have disfavored those
approaches, and have held governments liable under international
investment treaties for using government powers to compel investors
to give up their contractual rights.169 Thus, to the extent possible, a
government seeking to renegotiate should try to do so using only the
weight that a normal contracting party would use.
TERMINATING AN
INVESTOR-STATE CONTRACT
Another option for addressing land grievances related to the grant
or performance of an investor-state contract is termination of the
contract. The terms of the contract and domestic law (including,
in some legal systems, law developed by judicial doctrine) will
typically specify the grounds on which one or both parties may or
must terminate the contract and the remedies, if any, for taking such
action. One important consideration for a government considering
contract termination—even termination permitted under domestic
law and/or the contract—is whether international investment
treaties affect its exposure to claims and liabilities. Even if a government has concluded that it has valid rights to terminate the contract,
the investor may nevertheless seek to challenge that conclusion.
In addition, a government may occasionally decide that contract
termination is in its best interests even when not permitted; in
such a case, it may seek to terminate the agreement and then pay
compensation and/or face legal actions.
Contracts, and the rules of domestic law that govern them, typically
delineate circumstances in which termination by one or both parties
is permitted, sometimes accompanied by payment of compensation.
In some circumstances, a government thus may be entitled, and
may view it to be in its best interests, to put an end to contractual
relations with an investor. Additionally, a contract may be terminated
by judicial decision or other government act declaring the contract
void or unenforceable.
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF
CONTRACT TERMINATION?

There are various legitimate grounds on which a government party to
an investor-state contract may seek to terminate the deal, including a
desire to exit a controversial arrangement tainted by fraud or corrup-

tion, or to put an end to an unproductive relationship in which the other
contracting party fails to fulfill its obligations. Additionally, even if not
entitled to terminate the contract, a contracting party may nevertheless
determine that maintaining the deal is not in its best interests and seek
to exit the deal, paying compensation as required by applicable law.170
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS
RELATED TO CONTRACT TERMINATION?

Termination of an investor-state contract has potentially negative consequences at both the domestic and international law levels. In addition to
opposition from the investor, domestic consequences include opposition
from government officials and entities in support of the project, project
employees, individuals and entities that generate revenue based on
supplying goods or services to the investor, and individuals and entities
that depend on inputs produced by the investor. As a result of such opposition, the government entity responsible for terminating the contract
may face legal action, pressure from within the government, or pressure
from the public.
If the investor is a foreign investor, the investor’s home government
may use diplomatic channels to question or seek reversal of the decision
to terminate. If there is an international investment treaty in place that
covers the investor, the investor may also seek to bring an investor-state
arbitration claim to challenge the termination.171 When determining
whether and to what extent a government may be exposed to claims
and liability under international investment treaties, two key considerations are: (1) whether the contract was terminated using powers
and authority available to a normal contracting party (as opposed to a
government entity); and (2) whether the applicable treaty contains an
“umbrella clause.”
With respect to the first consideration, tribunals have typically determined that a government’s breach of an investor-state contract will not
constitute a breach of international law if the government was acting as
any normal contracting party. If, however, the government terminated
the contract through an exercise of sovereign powers (by, for example,
passing a decree or law, or issuing a judicial decision, declaring the
contract void), then that exercise of sovereign powers could potentially
give rise to an international law violation under the FET obligation or
obligation to provide adequate compensation for an expropriation.
The second consideration—whether the treaty has an umbrella
clause—operates as an exception to the first. While there are some
differences in opinion among arbitrators on this issue, the majority view
is that the umbrella clause allows covered foreign investors to bring
claims against host governments for contract violations (including
unlawful termination) even when the government has not exercised any
sovereign powers.
WHEN SHOULD A GOVERNMENT
CONSIDER TAKING THIS OPTION?

In some cases, grievances may be so severe, as well as difficult to remedy
while the investment continues, that cancellation of the investor-state
contract appears to be the best option. For the government entity
that is party to the contract, determining whether and when it should
take this option depends on an analysis of what is justified under the
circumstances, as well as what is permitted under the contract and the
law governing its interpretation. While applicable legal frameworks do
recognize situations in which a party may terminate an investor-state
contract, those grounds are often specifically defined and, even if
satisfied, may nevertheless require some form of remedy to be provided.
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In addition to terminating an agreement in accordance with its terms,
a government may also exercise its sovereign authority to terminate
an investor-state contract. A court, for example, may rule that a
contract is void under domestic law. Although the formal purpose
of such a holding may not be to address land grievances per se, the
case itself may have arisen from grievances related to the investment.
Courts play an important role in ensuring that investor-state contracts
are consistent with legal norms and policies, and this may require
decisions invalidating deals that violate domestic law. Such decisions,
however, are not immune from arbitration claims.
REVOKING AUTHORIZATIONS NECESSARY
FOR INVESTOR OPERATIONS
In certain cases, the reasons behind land grievances (for example,
the extent of environmental pollution) or the severity of their
effects (such as resulting violence) may cause a government to
revoke or terminate existing permits or other authorizations.
Ideally, the grounds and procedures for terminating existing
authorizations will be clearly set forth in domestic law, and may
provide permit holders certain rights of notice and appeal before
such action is taken. If government officials seek to comply with
the substantive and procedural requirements of the law when
terminating such authorizations, those actions are more difficult to
challenge under both domestic law and international investment
treaties.
Domestic law generally governs how investment-related authorizations (for example, environmental permits or investment licenses)
are provided and how they may be revoked or terminated, including
permissible grounds, procedures, and available remedies. These rules
differ between jurisdictions, and often vary depending on the nature
of the authorization and the activity that it governs. Depending on the
relevant rules in the host state, the government may have the ability—
and, in some cases, may be required—to revoke or terminate172
authorizations that are necessary for investment operations.
WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS
OF REVOKING AUTHORIZATIONS?

Revoking authorizations, such as permits or licenses, may have a
number of advantages for a government and for communities. This
step may help (and in some cases may be necessary to) address the
relevant grievance. Additionally, to the extent that the revocation
is done in accordance with applicable substantive and procedural
requirements, it helps to affirm the rule of law in the host country and
the government’s commitment to hold investors to their legal obligations. If the authorization was revoked because it had been issued
through fraud or corruption, or if the revocation was due to harms
caused by the investor, a subsequent reissuance to another investor
may produce a more positive outcome.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES
ASSOCIATED WITH THIS OPTION?

Revoking existing permits or other authorizations may pose various
legal, economic, and political challenges at the domestic and international levels.
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As with contract termination, a government decision to revoke an
authorization may prompt negative political and legal reactions at
the domestic level by those who would be negatively affected by the
revocation. For example, the entity whose permit, license, or other
authorization was revoked may contest the action through legal and/
or political avenues. Other stakeholders, such as individuals or entities
that rely on the operation of the investment project for employment,
sales revenue, or supply of inputs, may protest any decision that stops
or halts operations. Government entities that expect or depend on the
permitted activity for tax or other revenue may similarly
oppose revocation.
At the international level, a government may face diplomatic
pressure, as well as investor-state arbitration claims challenging the
permit revocation. The investor could, for example, potentially argue
that the revocation violated various obligations or prohibitions under
the treaty. While the fact that a revocation decision was taken in
good faith and in accordance with domestic law will help strengthen
a government’s defense in response to any such arbitration claims,
neither good faith nor compliance with domestic law will necessarily
immunize permit revocations from successful challenges under international investment treaties.

BOX 20: WHAT ARGUMENTS MIGHT AN INVESTOR
MAKE IF A PERMIT IS REVOKED?
An investor bringing a treaty-based arbitration case because of
a revoked permit might argue that the government violated the
following:
öö Non-discrimination obligations: for example, if the activities of
other domestic or foreign permit-holders also gave rise to grievances or were not conducted in strict compliance with the law,
but those permit-holders were nevertheless allowed to continue
operating, the investor whose permit was revoked might argue
that the revocation decision violated the investment treaty’s
national treatment or most-favored nation obligations;
öö Fair and equitable treatment obligation: for example, if the
permit was terminated without due process, the investor might
argue that this breached the FET obligation. Or if the investor’s
obligations under the permit had been interpreted and applied
in a particular way and then, due to a change in administrative policy or judicial doctrine, were subsequently interpreted
to impose more stringent requirements on the investor, the
investor might argue that the shift violated its “legitimate
expectations”;
öö Prohibition on uncompensated expropriations: for example, the
investor may argue that revocation of the permit destroyed the
value of its investment in the country, constituting an indirect
expropriation; and
öö Umbrella clause: for example, the investor may argue that the
decision to revoke the permit violated the government’s obligations to the investor under the umbrella clause, thereby asking
the tribunal to rule on the scope of the government’s and investor’s respective rights and obligations with respect
to termination.

WHEN IS REVOKING AN AUTHORIZATION
AN APPROPRIATE OPTION?

The clearest circumstances in which revocation of authorizations will
be an appropriate option are when:
öö Revocation is dictated by domestic law;
öö Revocation is required in order to fulfill the government’s obligations
under international human rights law; or
öö Revocation is necessary to address the grievances (or the circumstances giving rise to them), and allowed under the domestic
legal framework.
A government may, in comparison, face more difficult decisions when
its obligations under international human rights law are unclear, or
when there is uncertainty under domestic law regarding the grounds,
procedures, or remedies for terminating permits or other authorizations. Moreover, even when the appropriate course of action under
domestic law or international human rights law is relatively discernible,
it will be difficult to know in advance whether that action will trigger
an investment treaty claim and liability. An investment arbitration
tribunal may, for example, accept that the government’s revocation of
the authorization was necessary in order to comply with human rights
obligations while nevertheless deciding that the government is still
required to pay the investor compensation under the treaty.

GENERAL OPTIONS
When governments become aware of potential land grievances that
may arise in the future, they may be interested in exploring ways to
improve their overarching approach to addressing such grievances or
to minimize their general liability under investment treaties. Taking
proactive and general steps can be advantageous: they can help prevent
multiple conflicts from emerging, and, in the event that an investor
dispute arises in the future, a broad approach to addressing problems
may be viewed more favorably by an investment arbitration tribunal
than actions that appear targeted at a specific investor or project. Many
of the general steps described below, however, are not easily tailored
to specific situations, nor are they able to provide timely redress to
individuals or communities that have already suffered harm. In spite
of these limitations, a host government concerned about protecting its
citizens from the negative impacts of land-based investments may wish
to consider the steps below either before or after problems arise.
DEVELOPING A NATIONAL STRATEGY
FOR LEGAL AND POLICY REFORM
Land grievances will often center on issues that require comprehensive solutions, such as through law or policy reform. A government
may undertake a national policy strategy process to determine
how laws and policies can better protect against the negative
impacts of investors or other business operations. National Action
Plans on business and human rights (“NAPs”) are one example of
a strategic process that can be used to determine how to protect
against the negative impacts of investments.
Land grievances will often center on issues that are not limited to a
specific investment or community, such as the need to recognize and

protect undocumented community land rights across the nation, or the
desire to better balance the protections provided to investors and to
citizens. In such circumstances, a government may decide to investigate
whether legal or policy reform is needed to adequately respond to
issues underlying land grievances, resulting in the development of a
national policy strategy. One process that a government can pursue is
to develop a national action plan on business and human rights, which
will help the government to determine what reforms are needed. Using
the example of NAPs, this discussion sets out how a government can
embark on a policy strategy process to devise comprehensive solutions
that enhance compliance with international human rights law while still
complying with obligations under international investment law.
WHAT LEGAL OR PRACTICAL FORCE DO NATIONAL
POLICY STRATEGIES HAVE?

National policy strategies usually do not have any legal force, but are
intended to guide the government’s strategy regarding legal and policy
reform. Thus, while they will not change how investments are regulated
or establish new ways to redress grievances, policy strategies may
lead to laws and policies that do attain these objectives. In addition to
catalyzing legal reform, policy strategies may improve coordination
amongst different government departments, which can enhance the
government’s ability to regulate investments.
A national policy strategy process that helps to shape a government’s
efforts to protect human rights and influences its approach to legal or
policy reform may also affect an investor’s “legitimate expectations”
regarding how its investment might be affected by human rights issues.
This process thus might provide useful context for an investment
arbitration tribunal if an investor brought a dispute tied to the impacts
of such reform.

BOX 21: WHAT IS A NAP?
A National Action Plan on business and human rights is a national
policy strategy developed by a government that sets out how it will
protect against adverse human rights impacts caused by business
enterprises.173 A NAP is not a law, but rather a process by which
the government determines the laws or policies needed to ensure
that it is comprehensively preventing, mitigating, and remedying
adverse impacts of business on human rights.174 It can support legal
reform in a way that increases inter-governmental coordination
and policy coherence, and can provide a platform for ongoing
dialogue with relevant stakeholders.
Each NAP should be adapted to the specific circumstances of
the country,175 and ideally should be an ongoing process subject
to review, evaluation, and improvement, rather than a one-off
document.176 One aspect that can be included in a NAP is a national
baseline assessment (“NBA”), which is a means of taking stock
of existing laws and policies that currently address the human
rights impacts of business operations.177 As part of the NBA, a
government can carry out a comprehensive survey of existing
grievances by collecting data from multiple sources; this data can
be supplemented by additional baseline research.178 Analysis of the
research, including of the prevalence and gravity of various types of
grievances and rights violations, can help in determining how law
or policy reform could reduce the occurrence of negative human
rights impacts that lead to land grievances.
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WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF DEVELOPING
A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR LEGAL AND POLICY REFORM?

A government undertaking broad legal reforms, including reforms tied
to policy strategy processes such as a NAP, may confront some risks
related to its international investment law obligations. As explained
below in the discussion on adopting changes to the law, a negatively
affected investor may seek to argue that the changes to the law breach
various governmental obligations under an investment treaty.
However, the process of undertaking a national policy strategy does
not, in itself, raise these risks. As noted above, such a process may
actually be useful in providing some defense for a government’s actions
if a dispute was brought, providing a way for the government to show
that its reforms were reasonable, legitimate, and considered.
ADOPTING CHANGES
IN THE LAW
Grievances regarding land-based investments may arise because
there is a gap in the domestic legal framework (or a failure to
enforce it) that leaves the rights of affected individuals and communities inadequately protected. In other cases, applicable domestic
laws may create or exacerbate the grievances. In both of these
situations, changes to the legal framework may be appropriate or
necessary. Depending on the issue involved, these changes may be to
the constitution, to laws, or to regulations or administrative policies
or acts implementing those laws. The changes may be undertaken
by the legislative, executive, judicial, or other government branch.
In addition to opposition from certain stakeholders and associated
political hurdles, some of these changes may face legal challenges
regarding their consistency with other domestic and international
legal norms. Contractual stabilization clauses and international
investment treaties are two potential sources of conflict.
The establishment of a robust legal framework capable of equitably
governing rights over and use of land is an ongoing process. This
process involves various constituents and institutions that refine,
amend, modify, and even repeal standards and rules over time. While
there some limits on that flexibility, largely arising from constitutional
and international restraints on the freedom and powers of domestic
governments, significant latitude remains for governments to adopt
and change their laws, including to address grievances arising from
land-based investments.
WHEN SHOULD A GOVERNMENT
CONSIDER TAKING THIS OPTION?

The need to adopt certain changes in the law may be clear based on
the grievances that have arisen from land-based investments, and the
reasons for such grievances. This may be particularly apparent when
a law causes or augments the grievances. Alternatively, a government
may decide to undertake a more in-depth process to assess necessary
legal or policy reforms, for example through the development of a NAP,
as discussed above. Consideration of the need for legal reform may
also arise in response to an opinion from a human rights tribunal on
the incompatibility of a country’s domestic laws with its human rights
commitments, or following the establishment of new international
instruments, standards, or best practices concerning investments.
Changes in the legal framework can be a key and, indeed, necessary
option for a government seeking to holistically and effectively address
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serious problems regarding existing land-based investments. Despite
potential conflicts with stabilization clauses and international investment treaties, this option will therefore likely form a fundamental part
of a government’s strategy to address grievances, as well as its efforts to
prevent future grievances from arising.
WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS
OF ADOPTING THIS OPTION?

Changes to domestic legal frameworks may prompt political opposition, for example, from those who may be negatively affected by the
changes. Such changes may also lead to domestic legal challenges, such
as arguments that they violate constitutional protections, or did not
comply with appropriate procedures.
A government also confronts the risk that changes to the law may be
challenged by an investor as violating a stabilization provision in the
investor-state contract. Where stabilization clauses are enforceable,
an investor benefiting from such a clause may either be freed from, or
be entitled to compensation for the costs of, having to comply with
the changes in the law. Moreover, even if a domestic court might deem
the stabilization clause invalid, an investment arbitration tribunal
interpreting a contract with such a clause may adopt a different view,
enforcing it under the umbrella clause and/or fair and equitable treatment obligation.
Even in the absence of a stabilization clause, an investor that is
negatively affected by changes to the law might initiate an investment
arbitration claim under an applicable treaty. In doing so, it might argue
that such changes breach its right to fair and equitable treatment by
violating a legitimate expectation that relevant laws and policies would
not change, constitute discrimination by affecting the investor more
than other businesses, or amount to an expropriation of the investment.
REQUESTING AN ADVISORY OPINION
FROM A HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OR BODY
Seeking an advisory opinion from a human rights tribunal can
provide greater clarity on how a government can manage a potential
conflict between its human rights duties and its obligations under
international investment law. While an advisory opinion will not
be binding on an investment arbitration tribunal, its existence may
help to dissuade an investor from resorting to arbitration for loss
suffered as a result of a government’s actions taken to comply with
the opinion. The options for a government without access to regional
human rights courts that produce advisory opinions are more limited,
but include using the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic
Review (UPR) process to request recommendations from the international community.
Two regional human rights courts—the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, which covers the countries of the Americas, and the African
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which covers countries that are
members of the African Union—provide advisory opinions that clarify
a state’s human rights obligations in the absence of a formal dispute. A
government under the jurisdiction of either court could thus seek an
advisory opinion on complying with its human rights obligations in the
context of other legal obligations, such as those contained in international investment treaties. Such guidance would generally focus on

WHAT QUESTIONS CAN BE THE SUBJECT
OF AN ADVISORY OPINION?

overarching issues, rather than on specific investments or grievances.
A government that does not have access to either court can engage
with other human rights processes, although these options will usually
not offer guidance regarding specific instances of conflicting state
obligations. A government can also facilitate domestic litigation by not
opposing human rights claims brought against it (see Box 22), which
may lead to further clarity on how to meet its relevant obligations.
WHAT IS AN
ADVISORY OPINION?

Advisory opinions help interpret laws within the scope of an adjudicatory body’s purview. Regional human rights courts use advisory
opinions to interpret human rights law. Advisory opinions are interpretations of specific legal questions. They do not require an existing
dispute, and can consider hypothetical questions. Regional human
rights courts that provide advisory opinions do so upon request from
a government or from other institutions, such as a regional human
rights commission.
Not all adjudicatory bodies provide advisory opinions; investment
arbitration tribunals do not offer them.179 The European Court of
Human Rights provides limited advisory opinions, but not on the
content or scope of the human rights and freedoms set out in the
European Convention on Human Rights.180 While the International
Court of Justice provides advisory opinions, a state cannot
request one.181
WHAT LEGAL FORCE DO
ADVISORY OPINIONS HAVE?

Advisory opinions are not binding.182 They are persuasive, however, as
they are a formal expression of the court’s view on a particular legal
matter. Advisory opinions can therefore have significant influence
on the behavior of states—even states that have not submitted to
the court’s jurisdiction.183 This persuasive character makes advisory
opinions important sources for clarifying international legal rights and
corresponding governmental obligations.
WHAT PRACTICAL FORCE COULD
AN ADVISORY OPINION HAVE?

When a government believes that, by granting a concession, it has
created a situation in which its human rights obligations may conflict
with its international investment law obligations, seeking an advisory
opinion could provide greater clarity on how the government should
proceed. A government acting to protect human rights in accordance with an advisory opinion will not automatically avoid liability
under international investment law. However, the existence of an
advisory opinion may give pause to investors contemplating a claim
to an investment arbitration tribunal, particularly if the government
publicly acknowledges the advisory opinion and transparently sets
out to comply with it. For instance, arguments that a government has
discriminated against an investor or otherwise acted unreasonably are
weakened when its actions are clearly intended to comply with the
opinion of an authoritative adjudicatory body. An advisory opinion
thus may create doubts as to an investor’s chances of success, lower
its expectations regarding the amount of compensation it might
receive if successful, or raise its reputational risks if it were
to proceed.

Inter-American Court of Human Rights
A member state of the Organization of American States184 can seek an
advisory opinion from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on
questions regarding the compatibility of its own domestic laws with
the American Convention on Human Rights or with other treaties
concerning the protection of human rights in the American states.185
A government seeking guidance on how to respond to land grievances
could thus ask the Court whether implementing a proposed law to
comply with an investment treaty or investor-state contract is compatible with its human rights obligations.
The Court can exercise its discretion not to offer an advisory opinion,
even where the request put to it is admissible.186 When it has provided
such opinions in the past, it has issued them between one and three
years after receipt of the initial request.187
In addition to seeking an advisory opinion from the Inter-American
Court, a state can also request “advisory services” from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.188 Such advice is often initially
communicated privately to the state, but can be made public.189
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
Under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, member
states of the African Union can seek an advisory opinion from the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights “on any legal matter
relating to the Charter or any other relevant human rights instruments,
provided that the subject matter of the opinion is not related to a
matter being examined by the [African] Commission [on Human
and Peoples’ Rights].”190 This is likely broader than the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ jurisdiction, in that “any legal matter”
likely could include conflicts between the Charter, on one hand, and
international investment treaties, investor-state contracts, government
policies, or executive action relating to an investment, on the other.
While not explicitly mentioned, domestic laws that have an impact on
human rights concerns likely also come within “any legal matter.”191
The Court’s advisory jurisdiction is relatively untested, and it is
therefore difficult to predict the likelihood of its granting a request for
an advisory opinion. There is also no clear indication of how long the
Court might take to issue an opinion. The Court has so far released only
one advisory opinion,192 which was issued approximately one year after
the request was first received.
Members of the African Union technically may be able to request an
advisory opinion from the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights as well, although this has not yet been attempted.193
WHAT OPTIONS EXIST FOR COUNTRIES
WITHOUT REGIONAL COURTS?

Countries that do not fall under the jurisdiction of regional courts
that offer advisory opinions have fewer opportunities to obtain official
interpretations of their human rights obligations, and how they square
with their international investment obligations.
One potential option for member states of the United Nations
is to seek support or advice from other member states using the
Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process.
Each member state periodically undergoes a UPR, through which the
members of the Council evaluate the government’s human rights
performance and offer recommendations. During the UPR, the government will submit a national report,194 which can include a request for

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment

35

assistance.195 While the requests are usually for financial assistance or
technical expertise in establishing human rights institutions,196 member
states have occasionally requested advice on resolving human rights
problems.197 Any recommendations received in response would not
be legally binding, and likely would not be accompanied by extensive
analysis. Yet such recommendations could strengthen the perceived
legitimacy of government efforts to protect human rights in such
contexts and potentially provide new ideas for ways to address
land grievances.
BOX 22: ENCOURAGING
DOMESTIC LITIGATION
Aside from proactively seeking guidance, governments can obtain
further clarity on the human rights impacts of granting specific
concessions by encouraging, facilitating, or simply not challenging
domestic court claims brought against the government by individuals alleging human rights violations. This may not always be politically desirable, given the reputational and legal risks that litigation
can create. In some circumstances, however, such an approach
may be suitable—for instance, where a newly elected government
inherits grievances based on policies or administrative decisions
made by the former administration with which it also has concerns.
In such a situation, the government can encourage claims by
making its position clear, and by ensuring adequate access of those
aggrieved to independent legal advisors. The government can
facilitate claims by cooperating with court processes, providing all
pertinent information, and not objecting to the court’s jurisdiction
or defending the substantive case at trial.198

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF SEEKING
AN ADVISORY OPINION OR OTHER RECOMMENDATION?

While advisory opinions, or other formal recommendations, can provide
public and compelling clarifications of how a government should uphold
its human rights obligations in the context of overlapping obligations
under international investment law, they are not the final resolution of
specific conflicts. There is also no certainty that a request for an advisory
opinion will be granted.
One risk is that the existence of an advisory opinion may not
dissuade an investor from initiating an investor-state arbitration.
This may be especially true for investors that are not concerned with
their international reputation. This risk is compounded by the fact
that advisory opinions generally take years, rather than months, to be
produced. Another risk is that, if an investor does proceed with a claim,
the investment arbitration tribunal may not place much weight on the
advisory opinion. While tribunals may consider the rulings of a regional
human rights court,199 they are generally not bound to follow those
courts’ decisions.
INTERPRETING
INVESTMENT TREATIES
Establishing “subsequent agreement” and “subsequent practice”
on the meaning of international investment treaties can be
a feasible way for host governments to rein in overly broad and
unintended interpretations of those treaties. After signing and
ratifying such treaties, governments retain powers to help shape their
meaning. This includes using inter-state agreements and domestic
practices to demonstrate their understanding of international
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investment treaty obligations; under the rules governing treaty
interpretation, those subsequent agreements and practices must be
taken into account by tribunals when interpreting treaties. These tools
might be useful for governments that anticipate potential problems
related to land-based investments, and that are concerned about their
international investment treaty obligations being interpreted in a way
that they do not intend.
A host government that foresees potential conflicts with investors
regarding efforts to address land grievances may wish to assess how its
investment treaty obligations would be interpreted in any future disputes
brought before an investment arbitration tribunal. Although a host government cannot unilaterally change these obligations (except by pulling
out of a treaty altogether, as discussed below), it can take steps to assist
future tribunals in interpreting such obligations. Two important mechanisms available to governments to help influence tribunal interpretations
are through establishing “subsequent agreement” and “subsequent
practice” on the meaning of its treaties.
WHAT IS MEANT BY “SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT”
AND “SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE”?

International law of treaty interpretation recognizes the ongoing role
of states, as “masters of their treaties,” in managing the interpretation
and application of treaties they have signed. In particular, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”) provides that after states
have entered into a treaty, (1) any subsequent agreement by the parties
to the treaty regarding its meaning, and (2) any subsequent government practices in interpreting and applying the treaty that establish a
shared understanding of that instrument must be taken into account by
tribunals when interpreting the treaty.200
More specifically, the rules regarding “subsequent agreement” mean
that if, after an international investment treaty has come into force, the
state parties to the treaty expressly agree on an interpretation of a vague
BOX 23: NAFTA PARTIES’ STATEMENT CLARIFYING
THE MEANING OF THE FET OBLIGATION
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) specifically notes that interpretations issued by the NAFTA parties are
binding on investment arbitration tribunals.201 In response to
certain tribunals’ expansive interpretations of the NAFTA’s fair
and equitable treatment obligation (Article 1105) in early cases
arising under that treaty, the NAFTA parties issued a statement
clarifying their understanding of that provision. It states:
Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with
International Law
1. Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law
minimum standard of treatment of aliens as the minimum
standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party.
2. The concepts of “fair and equitable treatment” and “full protection and security” do not require treatment in addition to or
beyond that which is required by the customary international
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.
3. A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement,
does not establish that there has been a breach of Article
1105(1).202

provision, that agreed interpretation must be considered by investment arbitration tribunals. States can form these agreements through
an exchange of diplomatic notes, or through other steps, such as a
jointly issued statement. In 2001, for example, the parties to the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) issued a joint interpretation
to clarify the meaning of the fair and equitable treatment obligation in
that treaty, as noted in Box 23.
The rules regarding “subsequent practice” mean that, after an international investment treaty has come into force, if the officials of both state
parties to the treaty make statements or take actions reflecting a certain
shared understanding of the agreement, that shared understanding must
be considered by investment arbitration tribunals. Subsequent practice
can include “not only externally oriented conduct, such as official
acts, statements and voting at the international level, but also internal
legislative, executive and judicial acts, as well as” certain “practices by
non-state entities.”203 No specific form of conduct is required,204 nor is
there any requirement that it occur with any degree of frequency.205 Its
value depends on the extent to which it establishes “common understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the [treaty’s] terms.”206
If, for example, after signing investment treaties, officials in each
state party provide information to the public explaining that a “national
treatment” violation requires the claimant to provide proof of intentional, nationality-based discrimination, those statements can constitute
subsequent practice establishing an authoritative agreed interpretation
of the non-discrimination provision. Subsequent practice can also be
established by submissions states make to tribunals in the context of
disputes, whether as a respondent state or as a non-disputing party to
the treaty.
WHAT LEGAL FORCE DO “SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT”
AND “SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE” HAVE?

Subsequent agreements and subsequent practice can be used to narrow,
widen, or otherwise determine the range of interpretations that can be
given to a treaty.207 They help add clarity to vaguely worded clauses, but
are generally not presumed to amend or modify the treaty.208
Subsequent agreement and subsequent practice are not necessarily
conclusive on issues of interpretation. Tribunals are not generally bound
by them. Rather, tribunals must take subsequent agreement and practice
into account along with other means of treaty interpretation. Some
international investment treaties, however, specify that subsequent
agreements by the treaty parties are expressly binding on investment
arbitration tribunals.209 This gives the state parties clear and strong
authority to ensure that tribunals adhere to and apply the state parties’
understanding of their treaties.
Even in cases when state practice does not establish joint agreement
between or among treaty parties on an issue of interpretation, state
practice can still be relevant as a supplementary means of treaty interpretation that may be taken into account by tribunals. Unilateral statements and conduct by government officials clarifying and elaborating
on the government’s understanding of its treaty provisions therefore
can still be relevant for shaping interpretation of those treaties, even if
conduct of the other state party or parties to the treaty does not show a
shared interpretation.
HOW WOULD
THIS OPTION HELP?

ments have faced related to investment treaties have arisen from
vaguely worded provisions, which are vulnerable to broad interpretations by tribunals. This creates the possibility that a tribunal might
interpret obligations under a treaty in a way that the treaty parties did
not intend, and in a way that creates greater risks of liability for good
faith actions taken by a government to address land grievances.
A government can exercise its rights under international law to try to
clarify and narrow the scope of its investment treaty obligations. Subsequent agreement and subsequent practice can be used to help provide
needed clarification on issues such as the requirements for establishing
a violation of the non-discrimination obligation, the meaning of the fair
and equitable treatment obligation, the scope of the umbrella clause,
and, more generally, the relationship between international human
rights law and international investment law.
WHEN IS THIS
AN APPROPRIATE OPTION?

When ambiguity in international investment treaty provisions can
leave a government exposed to potentially significant litigation and
liability, including in response to efforts to address land grievances, the
government should consider clarifying the meaning of such provisions
by establishing subsequent agreement and subsequent practice. To do
so, a government can take any of the following concrete steps:
Alone and with other countries, a government can:
öö Make public its understanding of vague or uncertain treaty provisions
through unilateral action (e.g., by communicating its understanding
to the public, or posting interpretative statements on a website);
öö Monitor statements and practice of other parties to its treaties to
identify areas of agreement and disagreement; and
öö Cooperate with other states to establish and issue joint statements
clarifying ambiguous language.
In disputes, a government can:
öö Remain informed on the interpretation and application of its treaties;
öö Make its submissions, which constitute state practice, public;
öö Participate as a non-disputing state party in disputes arising under its
treaties; and
öö Make clear when it disagrees with interpretations given by tribunals.
In addition, in its future treaties, a government can insert provisions:
öö Ensuring that joint interpretations on some or all issues are binding
on tribunals;
öö Encouraging (or requiring) state parties to consult and cooperate to
resolve ambiguities on questions of interpretation and/or application;
and
öö Requiring that the home state or other non-disputing state parties:
(1) are notified of claims filed under their treaties, (2) receive
documents submitted to and issued by tribunals, and (3) can make
submissions to tribunals on issues of treaty interpretation.
Because tribunals have tended to discount the weight of governments’
statements regarding their understanding of treaty provisions that are
made in the context of disputes in submissions by respondent states, it
is important for a government, to the extent possible, to seek to clarify
ambiguities before claims arise.

Questions regarding the scope of treaty obligations are not always
settled by the terms of the treaty. Many of the problems that govern-
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DECLINING TO CONCLUDE NEW TREATIES,
AND TERMINATING OR NOT RENEWING EXISTING TREATIES
The costs posed by international investment treaties, including
threats to domestic policy space, the potential for incurring
high litigation costs, and risks of facing significant orders to pay
compensation to foreign investors, have led a growing number of
governments to review their policies regarding such treaties, as well
as to take steps such as placing moratoria on the negotiation of
new international investment treaties and terminating existing
treaties. These actions can help reduce states’ exposure to claims
and liabilities for conduct that affects the rights or expectations
of foreign investors. A government concerned about the costs of
investment treaties in the context of addressing land grievances
might wish to explore these steps.
As discussed throughout this report, international investment treaties
can constrain a government’s ability to address land grievances through
actions that affect the rights or expectations of foreign investors
without fear of incurring potentially significant litigation costs and
liabilities. A government may thus wish to consider whether the costs
of such treaties outweigh their benefits and, if so, to seek to minimize
or avoid those costs. As noted above, one strategy for minimizing the
costs of international investment treaties is to clarify and narrow the
meaning of treaty obligations. Other strategies are to refrain from
concluding new international investment treaties that provide for
investor-state arbitration or to terminate existing agreements.
WHAT ARE THE LIMITATIONS
OF THIS OPTION?

Not concluding future international investment treaties and terminating existing ones can help reduce a government’s exposure to claims
and liabilities under such treaties. Such strategies will not necessarily
eliminate the costs of these treaties, however.
For one, if a government decides not to conclude new international
investment treaties, it will still remain vulnerable to claims and liability
under existing ones. Given the ability of investors to structure their
investments in order to gain protection of investment treaties, this
limitation is greater than it may first appear.
Moreover, international investment treaties typically have survival
clauses stating that, if a government decides to terminate the agreement, the treaty (and its investor-state arbitration provisions) will
remain in force for a set period, which may range from 10 to 20 years.
Thus, even if a government terminates a treaty, it will still be subject to
claims and potential liability for a significant length of time. However,
a government can agree with the other state party to first amend the
treaty to remove the survival clause, and then terminate the treaty.
This approach has been taken to terminate certain treaties with
immediate effect.
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WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES
OR RISKS RELATING TO THIS OPTION?

Many international investment treaties were signed with relatively little
attention paid to and discussion of their implications. As the number of
arbitrations has risen, and governments have become
more aware of the treaties’ implications, various countries have paused
or stopped negotiations of treaties and/or sought to terminate existing
agreements. These actions, which have been taken by a diverse group
of countries, have often involved multi-year and multi-stakeholder
processes.
In developing their strategies toward existing and future international
investment treaties, governments have encountered some resistance.
Some governments, for example, have faced diplomatic pressure from
capital-exporting countries to conclude new agreements and to keep
existing treaties in force.210 Governments also report concerns that, in the
absence of treaties with investor-state arbitration provisions, the home
states of investors will use diplomatic pressure to press for resolution of
disputes in favor of their investors. Thus, treaties with such provisions
may, according to this reasoning, help avoid inter-state tensions. Governments have also noted concerns that not having investment treaties may
harm (or, at least, not help) their reputations as host countries and their
ability to attract foreign investment.
These concerns may be overblown. With respect to the concerns
regarding diplomatic pressure, evidence from investor-state arbitrations
and other sources indicates that, even when an international investment
treaty is in place between the host state and the investor’s home state,
the investor’s home state may still use diplomatic channels to try to
advance its investor’s interests.211 Treaties therefore may not be effective at removing diplomatic pressure. Additionally, regarding concerns
over the impacts on investment flows, data is inconclusive on whether
international investment treaties actually influence investors’ decisions
on whether and where to invest.212 Moreover, foreign direct investment
in South Africa and Indonesia rose in the year following those countries’
respective announcements that they were terminating existing bilateral
investment treaties.213
WHEN IS THIS AN
APPROPRIATE OPTION?

It is always useful for governments to analyze whether the costs of
existing or future international investment treaties outweigh their
benefits. Frameworks exist for analyzing whether to enter into new
treaties,214 providing key questions regarding the economic and political
benefits and costs that should be considered. A government that is
concerned about the implications of its international investment treaties
for its ability to effectively address land grievances could consider similar
questions to determine whether to terminate existing treaties.

CONCLUSION
The responsible governance of land-based investments hinges not only
on ensuring that new investments comply with guidelines and standards,
but also that the operations of existing investments are conducted
responsibly and that related grievances are adequately addressed.
Addressing actual or potential grievances offers benefits for both host
governments and investors, including a reduction of risks associated with
community conflict.

Yet dealing with land grievances can be complicated for host governments. This is particularly so when
the investor and project-affected communities have opposing perspectives on how to resolve grievances.
Moreover, the complex web of legal obligations that bind a government can constrain its options, rendering
it difficult to achieve optimal solutions in all cases.
As discussed in this report, however, host governments have a range of options at their disposal to
address land grievances. This includes actions to address specific grievances, as well as steps that can be
taken to either minimize potential liability under investment treaties, or to improve their general approach
to land-based investments and the grievances they engender. Not all options are suitable for every situation,
and some entail risks: for example, risks that the action may not address the grievance, or that the action
may expose the government to costly legal claims. The risk of doing nothing, however, may be greater.
Indeed, although this report discusses risks that arise under investment treaties, such risks are not reason
to preclude democratic responsiveness or good faith actions designed to comply with human rights obligations. Rather, analyzing its legal obligations is simply a useful first step for a government seeking to protect
its citizens against the negative impacts of land-based investments.
The options described in this report provide guidance on how governments can address concerns related
to existing land-based investments. In this way, the report is distinct from much of the existing research on
such investments, which emphasize ex ante best practices to be implemented before an investment occurs.
Yet the descriptions of the complex implications of governments’ legal obligations can also be read as a
cautionary tale, highlighting the urgency of getting land-based investments right from the start. Whether
a government currently hosts such investments, or plans to do so in the future, there are actions that can
be taken to promote more responsible investment, providing greater benefits and fewer problems for all
relevant stakeholders.
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GLOSSARY
This glossary defines key terms as used in this report.
Some terms may be defined differently in other contexts.

öö COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
a form of binding dispute resolution between two or more parties to a business venture or transaction,
which is usually established by the contract regulating that venture or transaction. Commercial arbitrations
are conducted before a private arbitrator or arbitrators.
öö CONCESSION:
the right, granted by a government to an investor, to use land or a property for the purposes of
an investment.
öö CONCESSION AGREEMENT:
an agreement made between a host government and an investor in which the government grants the
investor the right to develop and operate a particular investment project. It is a type of investorstate contract.
öö FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT (FPIC):
the right of a group of people, usually an indigenous community, to be consulted with and to provide or
withhold their approval before the establishment of any project that stands to directly affect access to
their lands, territories, or resources. A government must also obtain the FPIC of indigenous peoples before
adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures that may affect them. Any consent
obtained must be “free,” occurring without undue pressure or manipulation; it must be obtained sufficiently “prior” to the commencement of the project or public measure; and it should be given after the
community is sufficiently “informed” about all aspects of the project.
öö GRIEVANCE MECHANISM:
a routinized process through which an individual or group of people can bring complaints concerning any
aspect of an investment and seek a remedy. Grievance mechanisms can be operated by the host government, by the investor, or by other entities, and can be judicial or non-judicial in nature.
öö HOME GOVERNMENT:
the national government of the country in which an investor company is primarily based, headquartered, or
incorporated. Sometimes referred to as home country or home state.
öö HOST GOVERNMENT:
the national government of the country in which an investment takes place. Sometimes referred to as host
country or host state.
öö INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION:
a form of binding dispute resolution between an investor and a host government that is provided for in an
international investment treaty. International investment arbitration allows an investor to allege that the
host country has breached its obligations under an international investment treaty, and to seek damages
for that breach. The arbitration is conducted before a private arbitrator or arbitrators. Only an investor can
initiate an international investment arbitration claim. Also referred to as investor-state arbitration or investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).
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öö INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT TREATY:
a formal agreement between two or more countries establishing the terms and protections applying to
private investment by nationals and companies of one country (the home country) in another country
(the host country). International investment treaties also typically include provisions permitting investors
to initiate international investment arbitrations.
öö INVESTMENT ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL:
the arbitrator or panel of arbitrators in an international investment arbitration. The tribunal is the equivalent of a judge in a court proceeding. However, unlike judges who receive a salary from the state, arbitrators
are paid by one or both of the parties to the arbitration.
öö INVESTOR:
the commercial entity or individual carrying out a land-based investment project. This can include foreign
companies and individuals, as well as any company incorporated in the host country by them for the
purposes of implementing such investments.
öö INVESTOR PROTECTIONS:
clauses contained in an international investment treaty or an investor-state contract that require the
government to treat the investor in accordance with certain standards, such as the obligation to provide an
investor “fair and equitable treatment.”
öö INVESTOR-STATE CONTRACT:
a negotiated agreement between a government and investor covering at least some aspect of an investment
project; frequently a concession agreement. Different from a permit, license, or other authorization issued
by the government in its regulatory capacity.
öö LAND-BASED INVESTMENT:
an investment for the purposes of an agricultural or forestry project that is authorized by a concession,
permit, license, or some combination of authorizations.
öö LAND GRIEVANCES:
concerns raised by local individuals or communities in response to the actual, perceived, or potential
negative impacts of land-based investments.
öö RESTITUTION:
a measure to restore, for a wronged person, the situation that existed before the wrongful act was carried
out. While restitution can include a range of actions, this report focuses on restitution as the return of land
or property to displaced individuals and communities.
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FURTHER
RESOURCES
This is a non-exhaustive list of relevant guidance documents that may assist host
governments pursuing options discussed in this report. Additional resources related to
the report, including a training module and bibliography, are available at:
ccsi.columbia.edu/work/projects/land-grievances/

öö RESPONSIBLE LAND-BASED INVESTMENTS
»» Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, OECD-FAO Guidance for Responsible Agricultural Supply Chains (2015)
http://mneguidelines.oecd.org/OECD-FAO-Guidance.pdf
»» New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, Analytical Framework for Land-Based Investments in African
Agriculture: Due Diligence and Risk Management for Land-Based Investments in Agriculture (2015)
https://new-alliance.org/resource/analytical-framework-responsible-land-based-agricultural-investments
»» United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Operational Guidelines for Land-Based Investment (2015)
http://www.usaidlandtenure.net/documents/operational-guidelines-responsible-land-based-investment
»» French Agency for Development (AFD), Guide to Due Diligence of Agribusiness Projects that Affect Land and
Property Rights (2014)
http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/Guide-to-due-diligence.pdf
»» UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, Large-scale land acquisitions and leases: A set of
core principles and measures to address the human rights challenge (2009)
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/docs/BriefingNotelandgrab.pdf

öö DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES
»» Rees, C., Rights-Compatible Grievance Mechanisms: A Guidance Tool for Companies and Their Stakeholders (2008)
http://goo.gl/2LssjN

öö FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT; RESTITUTION; AND COMPENSATION
»» Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Respecting free, prior and informed consent: Practical
guidance for governments, companies, NGOs, indigenous peoples and local communities in relation to land acquisition
(2014) http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3496e.pdf
»» Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Compulsory Acquisition of Land and Compensation
(2008) http://www.fao.org/3/a-i0506e.pdf
»» UN Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an adequate standard of living,
Miloon Kothari, Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based Evictions and Displacement (2007)
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Housing/Guidelines_en.pdf

42

Land deal dilemmas: Grievances, human rights, and investor protections

öö NEGOTIATING AND RENEGOTIATING WITH THE INVESTOR
»» International Institute for Sustainable Development, IISD Guide to Negotiating Investment Contracts for Farmland
and Water (2014)
http://www.iisd.org/library/iisd-guide-negotiating-investment-contracts-farmland-and-water
»» Special Representative of the Secretary General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations
and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, UN Principles for Responsible Contracts (2011)
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